Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Charles WRIGHT, Appellant

v.

HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER COMPANY; James Wittman; Phil Petty and John Crenshaw, Appellees

No. 14-96-00575-CV.

|

April 17, 1997.

Panel consists of Justices YATES, HUDSON, and FOWLER.

OPINION

YATES.

*1 This is an appeal from a summary judgment. Charles Wright filed suit against appellees, Houston Lighting and Power Company, James Whitman, Phil Petty and John Crenshaw claiming: 1) retaliatory discrimination; 2) breach of employment contract; 3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 4) tortious interference with contract; 5) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 6) civil conspiracy. At the motion for summary judgment, Wright abandoned all claims except those for retaliatory discrimination, tortious interference with contract, intentional infliction of mental distress and civil conspiracy.

In six points of error, Wright complains the trial court erred in granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment and in denying his motion for new trial. Claiming that appellees’ actions were continuing torts, and that his causes of action did not accrue until appellees’ wrongful conduct ceased, Wright maintains the trial court erroneously held his claims were barred by the two year statute of limitations. Wright presents no points of error on appellees’ other summary judgment grounds.

Wright, an employee of HL & P, was injured in an automobile accident at the South Texas Nuclear Project, and filed a workers compensation claim for his injuries. After returning to work, he advised his supervisors that because of certain medical restrictions, he was unable to perform some of his duties as a Maintenance Specialist. Over the next year and a half, Wright’s restrictions varied. Sometimes he had no restrictions, at other times he was not allowed to lift over twenty pounds or walk over two city blocks.

In January 1991, Wright started keeping a diary “[b]ecause I felt like I was being discriminated against due to my injuries and my capabilities,” by his supervisors, Wittman, Petty and Crenshaw. Claiming they were retaliating against him because of his workers compensation claim, Wright asserts that appellees assigned him to meaningless and hazardous duties, and “conspired to and did engage in a pattern of conduct intended to harm and injury him emotionally, mentally, physically and financially.” This pattern of conduct was allegedly designed to force him to quit or become subject to demotion or dismissal. On May 21, 1992, Wright contends he was forced off the job when his supervisors ordered him to climb a tower in the rain to inspect non-existent equipment.

According to appellees’ summary judgment proof, Wright’s supervisors made allowances for his medical restrictions and “repeatedly accommodated” him on his job assignments. Appellees claim Wright 1) did not finish, or failed to complete assignments in an accurate and timely manner; 2) refused to perform assignments he could have easily completed without violating his medial restrictions; 3) was uncooperative; and 4) was counseled many times about his job performance, his negative attitude, his refusal to supply HL & P with a medical release to return to work, and his “express desire for a job transfer to a position other than Maintenance Specialist.” On May 22, 1992, appellant was placed on medical leave with full pay and benefits. On January 27, 1993, HL & P hired Wright as a Material Coordinator at the South Texas Nuclear Project, a position he apparently still holds.

*2 Appellees’ motion for summary judgment stated the following grounds:

1) Wright’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law;

2) Texas law does not recognize claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment cases;

3) Wright cannot state a claim for tortious interference with contract or conspiracy because a) the claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations; b) an employee cannot tortiously interfere with his employer’s contract; c) employees cannot be liable for conspiring with their employer; d) Wright has not suffered any damages;

4) Appellees cannot be liable for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law because: a) Texas law does not recognize a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress; b) Wright’s claim of infliction of emotional distress is barred by the two-year statute of limitations; c) Wright’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress must fail as a matter of law;

5) Wright has no valid claim for workers compensation retaliation because: a) appellant’s workers compensation retaliation claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations; b) Wright cannot show a causal connection between the alleged retaliation and his filing of a workers compensation claim.

Appellant’s response to appellees’ motion for summary judgment argued that:

1) the statute of limitations had not expired on any of his causes of action; and

2) there were numerous material and relevant questions of fact concerning each of his causes of actions.

The trial court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court stated that it was granting summary judgment because the statute of limitations had run. The order granting the motion did not specify the grounds on which it based its motion, but recited that it had

considered the motion, all responses, pleadings, affidavits, other evidence on file, and the applicable law. There are no material facts in dispute, and defendants Houston Light & Power Company, James Wittman, Phil Petty, and John Crenshaw are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Appellant’s six points of error address the statute of limitations issues discussed by the trial court during the summary judgment hearing. Unfortunately, he does not raise a general point of error that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, nor does he complain of or argue the other grounds on which the summary judgment may have been based.¹ In reviewing a summary judgment, we must base our review on the court’s written order, not on any oral statements the trial court may have made during the summary judgment hearing. Richardson v. Johnson & Higgins of Texas, Inc., 905 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Gannon v. Baker, 830 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). When a summary judgment order does not state the specific ground upon which it is granted, a party appealing from such order must show that each of the independent arguments alleged in the motion is insufficient to support the order. Id.; see also Malooly Bros., Inc., 461 S.W.2d at 121. The judgment must stand since it may have been based on a ground not specifically challenged by the plaintiff and since there was no general assignment that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Malooly Bros., 461 S.W.2d at 121. Accordingly, because appellant has failed to address appellees’ other summary judgment grounds, we need not address his points of error. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

	Footnotes
1		The Texas Supreme Court has held that a general point of error stating that “The trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment” will allow the nonmovant to dispute all possible grounds for the judgment on appeal. Plexchem Int’l, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 922 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.1996); Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970); see also Stevens v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 929 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, error denied).