Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

FORT BEND COUNTY, Appellant

v.

Melissa Ann NORSWORTHY, Appellee

NO. 14-17-00520-CV

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Majority Opinion and Dissenting Opinion filed March 21, 2019

|

Rehearing Denied April 18, 2019

Attorneys & Firms

Dean G. Pappas, Mary M. Markantonis, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

Amy L. Mitchell, Richmond, TX, Paula Heirtzler Blazek, Beaumont, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Spain and Poissant.

OPINION

Margaret ‘Meg’ Poissant, Justice

*1 This is a worker’s compensation subrogation case in which appellant Fort Bend County (“FBC”), a self-insured governmental entity, appeals the interlocutory judgment and order of severance in favor of appellee Melissa Norsworthy (“Melissa”). We affirm.

I. Background

On December 27, 2010, while working as a Fort Bend County Deputy Sheriff, John Norsworthy swerved to avoid road debris that had fallen off a flatbed delivery truck owned and operated by SBS/Bison Building Materials, LLC and driven by Morris Crosby. John suffered what would be fatal injuries. FBC initiated worker’s compensation benefits, paying one week of temporary income benefits of $ 689.47, medical benefits of $ 215,011.87, and after his death on January 4, 2011, FBC began paying the $ 766.00 weekly death benefit to the surviving spouse, Melissa, individually and as guardian of her minor son Jacob and minor daughter Katlyn, ages 16 and 13, respectively, at the time. Because Norsworthy was a first responder, his spouse, Melissa, will receive a worker’s compensation benefit for her life.

In 2014, in trial court cause number 14-DCV-213052, Jacob, John’s son, now an adult, sued Bison and Crosby (“Bison”) for the wrongful death of John. In Jacob’s second amended petition, he purported to bring his wrongful death claim on behalf of himself and all beneficiaries who have a wrongful death and survival cause of action.

On December 3, 2015, Jacob went to mediation with Bison. At the time of the mediation, Melissa, Jacob and Katlyn were individually receiving their statutory proportionate share of the worker’s compensation death benefits.¹ Katlyn, represented by attorneys, attended the mediation and presented her claim as a potential intervenor in the lawsuit. Melissa, represented by counsel, also appeared at mediation representing a potential claim from the estate of John. At mediation, Jacob and Katlyn agreed to settle with Bison for $ 1.7 million dollars ($ 849,000.00 each) and agreed to allocate $ 2,000.00 to John’s estate. Melissa, individually, did not participate in the mediated settlement agreement, did not sign the mediated settlement agreement, and did not share in her adult children’s third-party recovery. The settlement exceeded FBC’s statutory lien for past benefits paid to Jacob, Katlyn, and Melissa.

On January 26, 2016, FBC filed a petition in intervention in the Bison lawsuit seeking subrogation recovery for the worker’s compensation benefits it paid to Jacob, Katlyn, and Melissa. Thereafter, FBC and Jacob entered into a Rule 11 Agreement, settling the part of FBC’s lien applicable to Jacob’s half of the collective third-party recovery from Bison. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11.

In June 2016, FBC filed its motion for summary judgment against Katlyn and Melissa seeking to recover the remaining half of its statutory worker’s compensation lien on the collective third-party recovery. FBC asserted it was entitled to summary judgment because it had timely intervened prior to final judgment in the third-party Bison suit asserting its subrogation rights, the two-year statute of limitations did not apply to its right to reimbursement from the settlement made by the legal beneficiaries, and Katlyn’s recovery was for damages from a third-party tortfeasor liable for the compensable death of John, regardless of how the legal beneficiaries characterized it.²

*2 Melissa and Katlyn contested FBC’s subrogation rights. They argued in their traditional motion for summary judgment that the statute of limitations bars FBC’s subrogation claim. Next, Melissa asserted that FBC cannot establish the essential elements of its conversion claim and cannot recover for medical and temporary income benefits because she did not make any recovery from third-party, Bison. Additionally, she argued Jacob settled with FBC for an amount that exceeds the worker’s compensation death benefits paid to Jacob and Katlyn; therefore, the one satisfaction rule prevents FBC’s further recovery.

On February 10, 2017, FBC’s total worker’s compensation lien was $ 442,959.32. The trial court ordered disbursement of Jacob’s $ 849,000.00³ recovery on deposit with the registry of the court in accordance to the Rule 11 Agreement between Jacob and FBC. The disbursement gave FBC a $ 221,219.20 recovery from Jacob’s proportionate shares of the settlement proceeds, reducing FBC’s outstanding worker’s compensation lien to $ 221,740.12. After reduction of Jacob’s proportionate share of attorney’s fees and expenses, FBC made a net recovery of $ 145,057.58.⁴ All causes of action involving Jacob were resolved and severed.

On April 21, 2017, in an order styled “Defendant in Intervention Melissa Norworthy’s Interlocutory Judgment and Order of Severance,” the trial court granted in part Melissa and Katlyn’s summary judgment motion. The trial court rendered summary judgment as to Melissa only and dismissed all claims against Melissa in the subrogation case on the basis that she settled solely in her capacity as independent administratrix of the estate and received no settlement funds individually. The April 21, 2017 order also severed all claims against Melissa by FBC so that the interlocutory judgment became final on those claims. The order severed all claims into cause number 14-DCV213052-B (the “B” case). The trial court ordered FBC “to continue to pay worker’s compensation benefits to Melissa Norsworthy as long as she remains eligible under the statute.”

On May 19, 2017, FBC filed in the main trial cause number a document entitled, “Intervenor’s Motion for New Trial as to Defendant in Intervention Melissa Norsworthy,” complaining that the trial court’s April 21, 2017 order compromised FBC’s subrogation interest by ordering FBC to continue paying Melissa worker’s compensation benefits and denying FBC its right to apply its future credit/advance to those future benefits. FBC contends the trial court’s ruling results in the circumvention of the Act.

Realizing its motion for new trial should have been filed in the “B” case, FBC filed a motion to consider its motion for new trial timely filed, maintaining that the inadvertent filing of the motion for new trial in the main cause number was a clerical error. During a hearing, the trial court granted FBC’s motion to consider the motion for new trial timely filed in the severed “B” case, and signed an order to that effect in open court on July 28, 2017. On August 3, 2017, the trial court amended its order without notice to FBC and handwrote that the motion for new trial was timely filed as to the main cause number.

*3 On July 3, 2017, FBC filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order signed April 21, 2017. The notice of appeal contained both the main cause number and the “B” case. The appeal was assigned to this court under our appellate case number 14-17-00520-CV. On July 28, 2017, FBC filed a second notice of appeal from the April 21, 2017 order. The notice also contained both trial cause numbers and was assigned to this court under our appellate case number 14-17-00633-CV. The April 21, 2017, order is the only contested order in both appeals.

Subsequently, in this court, FBC filed an opposed motion to consolidate the related appeals. Melissa argued that both of FBC’s appeals should be dismissed because the judgment was not final in the main cause number and the notice of appeal was late in the “B” cause number. By per curiam opinion and order dated February 15, 2018, we granted appellant FBC’s motion to consolidate, in part, and transferred the record filed in 14-17-0633-CV into case number 14-17-00520-CV. Fort Bend Cty. v. Norsworthy, No. 14-17-00633-CV, 2018 WL 894050, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 15, 2018, no pet.) (per curiam). We dismissed the appeal in case number 14-17-00633-CV.⁵ Id.

II. Analysis

FBC raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in dismissing Melissa from the suit and ordering FBC to continue to pay her weekly death benefits; (2) whether the trial court erred in granting Melissa’s motion for summary judgment on FBC’s right to an advance against future benefits owed to Melissa; and (3) whether FBC’s motion for new trial was timely filed for purposes of appeal.⁶

Although Melissa labels an alternate reason to affirm the trial court’s summary judgment as a “cross point” in her appellee’s brief, it is not a cross point because it does not seek to alter the trial court’s judgment. Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(c).

A. Standard of review

The summary judgment standards of review are well-known. We review de novo the trial court’s order granting summary judgment. Ferguson v. Bldg. Materials Corp, 295 S.W.3d 642, 644 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam); Wyly v. Integrity Ins. Sols., 502 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and indulge reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in its favor. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005); Wyly, 502 S.W.3d at 904. “We credit evidence favorable to the non-movant if reasonable fact finders could and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable fact finders could not.” Id.

To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, a movant must establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists so that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant conclusively negates at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Wyly, 502 S.W.3d at 905.

B. Applicable law to worker’s compensation subrogation claims

*4 Under Section 417.001 of the Act, an employee who suffers a compensable injury may seek damages from a liable third party in addition to pursuing a claim for compensation benefits. Tex. Lab. Code § 417.001(a); Carty v. State Office of Risk Mgmt., 733 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2013), certified question answered, 436 S.W.3d 298, 302 (Tex. 2014). When an employee or beneficiary (claimant) claims benefits, “the insurance carrier is subrogated to the rights of the injured employee and may enforce the liability of the third party in the name of the injured employee or the legal beneficiary.” Tex. Lab. Code § 417.001(b); Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 302. Consequently, the carrier is subrogated to the employee’s rights, and the carrier’s subrogation interest includes the total benefits paid or assumed by the carrier to the employee or the legal beneficiary. Tex. Lab. Code § 417.001(b); Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 304.

Section 417.002 provides the net amount recovered by a claimant in a third-party action shall be used to reimburse the insurance carrier for benefits, including medical benefits, that have been paid for the compensable injury. Tex. Lab. Code § 417.002(a); Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 302. Amounts recovered in excess of the amount of the reimbursement required under Section 417.002(a) are treated as an advance against future benefits, including medical benefits, that the claimant is entitled to receive. Tex. Lab. Code § 417.002(a-b); Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 302. If the advance is adequate to cover all future benefits, the insurance carrier is not required to resume the payment of benefits, but if the advance is insufficient, the insurance carrier shall resume the payment of benefits when the advance is exhausted. Tex. Lab. Code § 417.002(c); Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 302.

The Supreme Court of Texas recently addressed these provisions:

In most cases, workers’-compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy against a workers’-compensation subscribing employer for on-the-job injuries. See Tex. Lab. Code 408.001(a); Port Elevator–Brownsville, L.L.C. v. Casados, 358 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex. 2012). But an employee may still seek damages from a liable third party in addition to receiving workers’-compensation benefits. See Tex. Lab. Code § 417.001(a); State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Carty, 436 S.W.3d 298, 302 (Tex. 2014). Similarly, a workers’-compensation carrier is “subrogated to the rights of the injured employee and may enforce the liability of the third party in the name of the injured employee.” Tex. Lab. Code § 417.001(b). Under either scenario, the “net amount recovered by a claimant in a third-party action shall be used to reimburse the insurance carrier for benefits, including medical benefits, that have been paid for the compensable injury.” Id. § 417.002(a). The upshot of these provisions is that “until the carrier ‘is paid in full[,] the employee or his representatives have no right to any funds.’ ” Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d 31, 33 & n.1 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Baker, 87 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. 2002) ).

Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wedel, 557 S.W.3d 554, 556 (Tex. 2018).

C. Trial court correctly found Melissa made no third-party recovery

In its first and second issues, FBC advances the argument that the third-party recovery by Melissa’s adult children is imputed to Melissa and, as a result, the trial court erred in ordering FBC to continue paying Melissa weekly benefits and not suspending Melissa’s future benefits. According to FBC, the trial court’s order effectively applied a beneficiary-by-beneficiary standard rather than a collective-recovery standard to FBC’s worker’s compensation reimbursement and future credit in contravention of binding legal precedent.

*5 Melissa contends that Section 417.002 of the Labor Code only applies if a claimant (i.e., an employee or a decedent’s legal beneficiary) secures a third-party recovery. Melissa maintains she made no individual recovery. She neither shared nor participated in her adult children’s third-party recovery. Thus, Melissa contends that the collective-recovery standard does not apply in this case and the trial court correctly ordered FBC to continue paying Melissa’s death benefits.

1. Melissa, in her individual capacity, made no recovery from a third-party

It is undisputed that Melissa, in her individual capacity, did not seek recovery from Bison. Her son, Jacob, filed a wrongful death suit against Bison purportedly on behalf of all beneficiaries.⁷ Jacob, however, did not name Melissa in the petition.⁸ Melissa did not participate in the prosecution of the case or mediated settlement agreement with Bison or sign a release in her individual capacity.⁹ No portion of her adult children’s settlement was allocated for Melissa’s individual benefit.¹⁰ If FBC chose to object to apportionment of the mediated settlement on the basis that Melissa, a necessary party, was not included in the settlement, that issue is not before this court on appeal. FBC’s appeal is limited to the trial court’s order granting Melissa’s summary judgment motion and ordering continued death benefit payments.

For the above reasons, the trial court correctly found Melissa made no third-party recovery and FBC was required to continue to pay her death benefits. Because Melissa did not make a recovery from the third-party, her continued receipt of death benefits from FBC does not amount to a “double recovery.”

2. Collective-recovery standard inapplicable to Melissa

*6 FBC argues that beneficiaries are treated collectively for purposes of worker’s compensation. FBC maintains that the effect of the trial court’s order is a double recovery for the worker’s compensation beneficiaries.

“[W]hen multiple beneficiaries recover compensation benefits through the same covered employee, the carrier’s rights to a third-party settlement are determined by treating it as a single, collective-recovery rather than separate recoveries by each beneficiary.” Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 300. Collectively, the legal beneficiaries are not entitled to both worker’s compensation benefits and the third-party recovery because retention of both results in a double recovery. See Foreman v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 15 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.).

FBC’s cases are inapplicable to the underlying facts of this case. As set forth, supra, Melissa made no third-party recovery. FBC has not provided any applicable authority that allows FBC to attribute the third-party recovery of Melissa’s adult children to her.¹¹ Under the facts of this case, the cases applying the collective-recovery standard are distinguishable and, thus, this standard does not operate to suspend Melissa’s weekly benefits or future benefits.

FBC’s issues are overruled.

III. Conclusion

Having overruled overruled FBC’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s April 21, 2017 final judgment.

(Frost, C.J., dissenting).

DISSENTING OPINION

Kem Thompson Frost, Chief Justice, Dissenting

The Supreme Court of Texas has considered the right of a workers’ compensation carrier to treat a third-party recovery as an advance against future benefits in a case involving multiple beneficiaries of the same covered employee. In binding judicial dicta, the high court has pronounced that the determination should be made on a collective-recovery basis. Applying that rule to today’s case means that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and ordering the carrier to pay workers’ compensation benefits to the deceased employee’s widow.

An employee who suffers a compensable injury under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act may seek damages from a liable third party in addition to pursuing a claim for compensation benefits.¹ When an employee or beneficiary claims benefits, “the insurance carrier is subrogated to the rights of the injured employee [up to the total benefits paid or assumed] and may enforce the liability of the third party in the name of the injured employee or the legal beneficiary.”² The carrier is entitled to reimbursement from the third-party recovery under the following scheme:

(a) The net amount recovered by a claimant in a third-party action shall be used to reimburse the insurance carrier for benefits, including medical benefits, that have been paid for the compensable injury.

(b) Any amount recovered that exceeds the amount of the reimbursement required under Subsection (a) shall be treated as an advance against future benefits, including medical benefits, that the claimant is entitled to receive under this subtitle.

*7 (c) If the advance under Subsection (b) is adequate to cover all future benefits, the insurance carrier is not required to resume the payment of benefits. If the advance is insufficient, the insurance carrier shall resume the payment of benefits when the advance is exhausted.³

In State Office of Risk Management v. Carty, the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that the statutorily undefined term “claimant,” as used in Labor Code section 417.002, refers to the covered employee or the beneficiaries recovering workers’ compensation benefits through that employee.⁴ Thus, under the Carty court’s construction of the statute, Labor Code section 417.002(b) provides that any amount recovered by the employee or the employee’s beneficiaries in a third-party action that exceeds the amount of the reimbursement required under section 417.002(a) must be treated as an advance against future workers’ compensation benefits that the employee or the employee’s beneficiaries are entitled to receive.⁵

The Carty court stated that, until a workers’ compensation carrier is reimbursed in full, the employee or the employee’s representatives have no right to any of the third-party recovery.⁶ The Carty court concluded that the net amount recovered by the “claimant” referenced in Labor Code section 417.002(a), from which the workers’ compensation carrier must be reimbursed for benefits already paid, is the collective third-party recovery by the employee or the employee’s beneficiaries.⁷ The Carty court reasoned that, because a beneficiary’s right to death benefits and a carrier’s right to reimbursement both flow through the covered employee, it makes sense to calculate the reimbursement right in relation to the total third-party recovery by a particular employee or the employee’s legal beneficiaries.⁸ According to the Carty court, because the law undisputedly treats past benefits collectively under section 417.002(a), future benefits should be treated the same way under section 417.002(b).⁹

The Carty court agreed that even if multiple beneficiaries recover in a third-party settlement, courts should treat the settlement as a single recovery when enforcing the compensation carrier’s right to treat the recovery as an advance against future benefits.¹⁰ The Carty court concluded that “[c]onsistent with the text and purpose of the reimbursement scheme under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, a workers’ compensation carrier’s right under section 417.002 to treat a third-party recovery as an advance of future benefits in a case involving multiple beneficiaries of the same covered employee should be determined on a collective-recovery basis.”¹¹ After acknowledging that the collective-recovery rule might produce results that some might find inequitable, the Carty court stated that “[a]ddressing the potential inequities that subsection 417.002(b) can generate is a policy decision for the Legislature, not the courts.”¹²

*8 Appellant Fort Bend County, the workers’ compensation carrier in today’s case, asserts that the Carty court’s construction of section 417.002 as mandating a collective-recovery rule applies to this case. The majority concludes that the Carty court’s construction of section 417.002 does not apply because one of the beneficiaries in today’s case, appellee Melissa Ann Norsworthy, did not recover any amount against a third party in her individual capacity.¹³ Melissa¹⁴ did not recover against any third party in her individual capacity, and the facts of today’s case are not the same as the facts in the Carty case.¹⁵ Thus, today’s case does not fall within the Carty court’s holding.¹⁶ Nonetheless, under the doctrine of judicial dictum, the Supreme Court of Texas’s construction of a statute may be binding on this court even in cases in which the facts do not fall within the scope of the high court’s holding.¹⁷ The Carty court made deliberate statements for future guidance in the conduct of litigation.¹⁸ These statements are judicial dicta that bind this court.¹⁹

Because Melissa receives workers’ compensation benefits through the covered employee (her deceased husband, Deputy Sheriff John Norsworthy), under the Carty judicial dicta Melissa falls within the definition of “claimant.”²⁰ Under these statements, Melissa, Katlyn, and Jacob all fall within the meaning of “claimant” so that a recovery by Katlyn means that the “claimant” has recovered against a third party, entitling Fort Bend County to an advance under section 417.002(b) against the future benefits of Melissa, Katlyn, and Jacob.²¹ The Carty court spoke in broad terms as to section 417.002’s meaning, and the high court did not state that it was limiting this construction to the fact pattern in Carty or to a particular factual situation.²²

Under Carty, if there are two beneficiaries entitled to future benefits, and one secures a net recovery of $ 1,000,000 against a third party while the other secures a net recovery of $ 1,000 against the third party, without any deduction based on the workers’ compensation lien, then neither beneficiary gets any future workers’ compensation benefits until the aggregate of the past benefits paid to each beneficiary and the amount of future benefits not paid to each beneficiary under section 417.002(b) equals $ 1,001,000.²³ The Carty court’s analysis and pronouncements on the meaning of section 417.002 do not provide any basis for concluding that the result should be different if the second beneficiary has a net recovery of zero rather than a net recovery of $ 1,000.²⁴ Though some might view this result as unfair, the high court has instructed that the remedy lies in the legislative branch of Texas government rather than in the judicial branch.²⁵

Under the Carty‘s court’s construction of section 417.002(b) as implementing a collective-recovery rule, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, ordering Fort Bend County to pay Melissa workers’ compensation benefits, and failing to give Fort Bend County any advance under section 417.002(b) against Melissa’s future benefits. Because the majority reaches the opposite conclusion, I respectfully dissent.

	Footnotes
1		Melissa receives one-half of the benefit and the two adult children, Jacob and Katlyn, receive one-fourth of the benefit, each.
2		Katlyn claimed her recovery was for a bystander claim.
3		49.9412% represents Jacob’s $ 849,000 proportionate share of the total $ 1.7 million third party settlement.
4		FBC asserted that the net amount recovered by Jacob and Katlyn in excess of FBC’s lien is the future credit as defined by the Act (also known as the “holiday”). See Tex. Lab. Code § 417.002(b). At this time, only Jacob’s $ 411,646.64 net recovery of the “holiday” has been finally determined and distributed.
5		For the reasons set forth in the court’s February 15, 2018 memorandum opinion, the companion motion to dismiss filed in this case is denied. Fort Bend Cty. v. Norsworthy, No. 14-17-00633-CV, 2018 WL 894050, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 15, 2018, no pet).
6		As set forth, supra, this court previously determined FBC’s third issue on February 15, 2018. Fort Bend Cty. v. Norsworthy, 2018 WL 894050, at *3. As such, FBC’s third issue is denied as moot.
7		Under the Texas Wrongful Death Act, a wrongful death claim derives from the cause of action the decedent could have asserted for personal injuries had he lived. Russell v. Ingersoll–Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1992). All or anyone of the parties, to whom the right of action is given, may bring suit and where it is brought by only one [or some but not all] of the parties, it must appear that the suit was brought for the benefit of all. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.004(b). Moreover, the suit may be brought for the benefit and use of those not actually prosecuting the claim without their knowledge or consent. See Dennis v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 148 Tex. 387, 224 S.W.2d 704, 705 (1949).
8		All of the parties who are to share in the recovery must appear on the face of the petition, and the judgment should award to each of the parties for whose benefit the action is brought the share as found and directed by the trier of fact. Avila v. St. Luke’s Lutheran Hosp., 948 S.W.2d 841, 850 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
9		The provision of the act requiring all of the beneficiaries to be parties was enacted chiefly for the benefit of the defendant in such suit, to protect it against the bringing of several suits arising out of the same transaction; and if it neglects to require this to be done, those who are not parties are not precluded by a judgment rendered in a case brought by the other beneficiaries. See Schwing v. Bluebonnet Exp., Inc., 470 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 489 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1973). A defendant’s failure to raise the non-joinder issue may result in its waiver. Avila, 948 S.W.2d at 850.
10		If the defendant chooses not to object in some manner or except to the pleadings, the defendant runs the risk that the missing beneficiaries will not be precluded from pursuing their claims by a judgment to which they were not parties. Avila, 948 S.W.2d at 851.
11		The dissent argues that we are bound by the dicta in Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 302–06, seemingly conflating a workers’ compensation “claimant,” which Melissa is, with a Texas Labor Code section 417.002 “claimant in a third-party action,” which Melissa is not. We must read the phrase “claimant in a third-party action” in context and construe it according to the rules of grammar and common usage. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011(a).
1		Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 417.001(a)(West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.).
2		Id. § 417.001(b)(West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.).
3		Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 417.002 (West, Westlaw through 2017 R.S.).
4		See 436 S.W.3d 298, 304, 305 (Tex. 2014).
5		Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 417.002; Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 302–04.
6		See Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 303.
7		See id.
8		See id. at 304.
9		See id.
10		See id. at 302–03.
11		See id. at 307.
12		Id. at 306.
13		See ante at 11.
14		Because this case involves several people with the same last name, individuals in the family are referred to by their first names.
15		See Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 300–01.
16		See id. at 302–06.
17		See Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wootton, 494 S.W.3d 825, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
18		See id.
19		See id.
20		See Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 302–06.
21		See id. In this dissenting opinion, it is not necessary to address the effect of Jacob’s settlement with Fort Bend County.
22		See Carty, 436 S.W.3d at 302–06.
23		See id.
24		See id.
25		See id. at 306.