Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
CURLEE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., Appellant,
v.
THE CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Appellee.
No. 01-97-00917-CV.
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Jan. 14, 1999.
WILSON, ANDELL, and SMITH1, JJ.
OPINION
WILSON.
*1 In this appeal, appellant, Curlee Manufacturing Company, Inc., claims the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment on Curlee’s breach-of-contract claim against appellee, the Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company, Inc. We affirm.
Facts
Larry Graham, an employee of Curlee, was injured in July 1988. Graham initially claimed the injury was not work related, and the medical bills were submitted to Curlee’s group health insurance carrier. Because Curlee’s group health insurance policy contained a $25,000 deductible, Curlee paid to Graham the first $25,000 of his medical expenses.
In January 1989, Graham filed a workers’ compensation claim stating his injury was work related. In December 1989, Charter settled with Graham for $27,000, and Graham signed a compromise and settlement agreement in which he agreed to pay all his past and future medical expenses related to the injury. In May 1990, Curlee requested reimbursement for the $25,000 it paid to Graham. On June 11, 1990, Charter denied the request and directed Curlee to Graham for reimbursement.
Curlee sued Charter and its insurance agent, The Travelers Insurance Company, Inc. The trial court rendered a combined dismissal for want of jurisdiction and take-nothing summary judgment. Curlee appealed to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded. See Curlee Mfg. Co. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., No. B14-92-01298-CV (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 26, 1994, no writ) (not designated for publication). On remand, the trial court rendered a partial take-nothing summary judgment for Curlee on its contract claims and dismissed all other claims and parties. Curlee brings a single issue on appeal, claiming the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment.
Discussion
In Charter’s sixth supplemental motion for summary judgment, it contended that it owed no contractual duty to reimburse Curlee for the $25,000 payment Curlee made to Graham. Charter also relies in part on part four, paragraph 6 of its workers’ compensation policy, which states, “Do not voluntarily make payments, assume obligations or incur expenses, except at your cost.”
Curlee spends the majority of its appellate brief addressing the facts and why Charter may not assert various defenses, e.g., estoppel and law of the case. Even assuming that Curlee is correct, it must still demonstrate why the summary judgment was erroneous.
Charter moved for summary judgment in part on the theory that it owed no contractual duty to reimburse Curlee. Taking all disputed material facts issues in favor of Curlee, as we must, we then look to see if Charter is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985).
Even assuming that Curlee did not know Graham would make a workers’ compensation claim at the time Curlee paid the $25,000, we must still decide, as a matter of law, whether Charter had a contractual duty under the workers’ compensation policy to reimburse Curlee. Curlee makes no argument and cites no legal authority in its appellate brief to demonstrate why the workers’ compensation policy creates such a duty to reimburse.
*2 We have read the insurance policy and conclude that Curlee has no specific contractual basis on which to seek reimbursement from Charter. Accordingly, we overrule Curlee’s sole issue presented.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Footnotes |
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The Honorable Jackson B. Smith, Jr., retired Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas at Houston, participating by assignment. |
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