Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Roy Wayne REID, Appellant,
v.
LA PORTE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
No. 01-90-00599-CV
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May 30, 1991.
Before DUGGAN, MIRABAL and O’CONNOR, JJ.
DUGGAN, Justice.
O P I N I O N
*5 Roy Wayne Reid (”Reid”) appeals from a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of his employer, the La Porte Independent School District (”La Porte”) in a workers’ compensation case. We reverse and remand.
While employed by La Porte in April 1978, Reid was injured when a school bus fell on him. Reid returned to work for La Porte for several years–from May 16, 1978 until 1984–and in 1984, he filed a workers’ compensation claim based on the 1978 accident. On June 15, 1988, the Industrial Accident Board (IAB) entered its final award, ordering La Porte to pay Reid:
$109 per week for 109 consecutive weeks for total temporary disability beginning on 04-06-78; and
$37.33 per week for 292 consecutive weeks (following payment of compensation, if any for total disability) for $56.00 permanent loss of wage earning capacity [$37.33 is 66 2/3 per cent of $56.00].1
*6 (Emphasis added). The Board further found that payments of compensation had matured and were payable in a lump sum of $22,781.36.2
La Porte appealed the Board award by filing a suit to set it aside in district court.3 Reid answered with a general denial and filed a counterclaim, alleging that he was entitled to $91.00 per week for 401 weeks for injuries and incapacity under the workers’ compensation act, plus claims for interest, medical benefits, costs of court, and attorney’s fees.
La Porte asserts that it paid compensation on Reid’s claim for a total of 109 weeks from May 3, 1984 and continued through April 25, 1986,4 that the 109 weeks of compensation is the maximum amount it is required to pay by law because “the maximum compensation period is to be 401 weeks from the date of injury,” and that 401 weeks after the date of Reid’s accident (April 5, 1978) is until December 20, 1985. La Porte claims that it made most of its 109 payments within the 401-week period, concedes it made extra compensation payments after the 401-week period, and asserts it owes nothing further because any “further” compensation to Reid will fall “outside” the 401-week period established by law.
The parties were realigned so that Reid was plaintiff, and La Porte was defendant.
La Porte’s motion for summary judgment
La Porte’s motion alleged that it was entitled to summary judgment “based on one defense,” the affirmative defense that the maximum compensation period is to be 401 weeks from the date of injury. La Porte alleged that the 401 weeks compensation period ran from the time of Reid’s injury, April 5, 1978, until December 20, 1985, and that “[c]ompensation has already been paid for this period,” as shown by its accompanying affidavit.
La Porte cites two cases for the proposition that “the maximum recovery period is 401 weeks from the date of injury and that compensation cannot be claimed for any time beyond 401 weeks from the date of injury.” Archuleta v. International Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1984); TEIA v. Guidry, 99 S.W.2d 900, 901-02 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1937, opinion adopted). In Guidry, the worker was injured in February 1926. He sustained temporary, total incapacity for work for a period of approximately 30 days. He returned to work in March 1926 and continued to work until October 1933, when he again became totally incapacitated because of the 1926 injury. He then sought to recover benefits for the 401-week period beginning in October 1933. The Commission of Appeals rejected his contention, holding that the compensation period is limited to the 401 weeks from the date of injury, not the date when total incapacity developed. Guidry, 99 S.W.2d at 902. Archuleta simply recites “the maximum period of time for which a Plaintiff can recover for partial incapacity is 300 weeks.” Archuleta, 667 S.W.2d at 122.
*7 It is undisputed that workers’ compensation pays for total permanent disabilities occurring within 401 weeks of the date of an accident, and for partial incapacity occurring within 300 weeks of an accident. However, La Porte’s proof does not conclusively establish that it owes no further compensation for the 401-week period following Reid’s injury.
La Porte’s motion is supported by the affidavit of Lance Nauman, insurance representative for La Porte. It states:
Mr. Reid was allegedly injured on April 5, 1978, while employed by La Porte Independent School District. Workers’ compensation maximum period ran from April 6, 1978, through December 20, 1985 [401 weeks]. Mr. Reid continued to work for La Porte until May 3, 1984, when he was again taken off work due to this 1978 injury. Compensation was started from May 3, 1984, and continued through April 25, 1986. A total of 109 weeks of compensation was paid on the claim. The compensation period required by Article 8306, Sections 10 and 11 state that the maximum compensation period is to be 401 weeks from the date of injury.
Reid’s two-page response alleges “no evidence was offered by [La Porte] as to the rate at which [Reid] was paid compensation. It is a question of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s incapacity was total and permanent so as to entitle him to the maximum compensation benefit for the entire 401 weeks from the date of injury.”
The trial court granted La Porte’s motion for summary judgment and overruled Reid’s motion for new trial.
Reid’s Point of error
Reid’s single point of error maintains that the trial court erred in granting La Porte’s motion for summary judgment because the summary judgment proof is insufficient as a matter of law. Reid maintains that genuine fact issues exist regarding the extent and duration of his incapacity; that La Porte failed to satisfy its negative burden of proof that all of his claims were barred as a matter of law; and that La Porte’s motion for summary judgment did not address the issue of his postaccident employment as a period of incapacity.
La Porte’s motion for summary judgment is insufficient because it does not answer Reid’s claim. While Reid’s claim sought the maximum compensation benefit for 401 weeks, La Porte’s reply was that it paid 109 of those weeks beginning in May 1984, and owes nothing further. La Porte overlooks the fact that Reid’s claim seeks compensation for incapacity during the entire 401-week period beginning April 5, 1978, the date of the accident. Further, La Porte’s motion does not address all of Reid’s claims (e.g., open medical and total disability for 401 weeks).
La Porte’s case is based on the affidavit of its insurance representative, Lance Nauman, reciting that “compensation was started from May 3, 1984, and continued through April 25, 1986.”5 The affidavit also asserts that Reid received 109 weeks of compensation. Based on these facts, La Porte argues that any further compensation would be for a period beyond 401 weeks from the 1978 accident because “compensation was started on May 3, 1984.” Nauman’s testimony, however, assumes that Reid was paid all monies due him for the 401-week period following his injury of April 1978. In contrast, Reid maintains that he has not been fully paid for the 401-week period.
*8 The Board’s final award tends to support Reid’s contention, indicating that Reid was to be paid compensation for the 401-week period following his injury:
“$109 per week for 109 consecutive weeks for temporary total disability beginning 04-06-78…,” and “$37.33 per week for 292 consecutive weeks compensation (following payment of compensation, if any for total disability).”
The Board also concluded that “all payments of compensation are matured.” L a Porte has not conclusively established that it satisfied its 401-week lia bility for benefits for the period April 1978 to December 1985. Further, La Porte never introduced evidence of how much compensation it paid Reid dur ing the 109- weeks for the 401-week period, and neither La Porte’s pleading nor the judgment addressed Reid’s claim for continuing medical expenses.
Under TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c), a summary judgment is proper only when a movant establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972). In a summary judgment proceeding, the burden of proof is on the movant, and all doubts about the existence of a genuine fact are resolved against the movant. Roskey v. Texas Health Facilities Comm’n, 639 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.1982). Once a movant has established a right to a summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to respond and present to the trial court any issues that would preclude summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979). Appellate courts review evidence in a summary judgment case in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985).
The affirmance of a summary judgment for a defendant depends upon whether the summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. If the defendant’s summary judgment proof does not meet this standard, then the plaintiff does not have the burden, to avoid summary judgment, of going forward with summary judgment proof of like quality.
Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. App.– Austin 1989, writ dism’d).
La Porte’s motion for summary judgment asserts that it owes no further compensation because, as a matter of law, the maximum recovery period for workers’ compensation benefits is “401 weeks from the date of injury.” We have no quarrel with this fundamental legal proposition. See TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8306, Sec. 10 (Vernon 1967) & Sec. 11 (Vernon Supp. 1991). Here, however, the principle of “no compensation is owed for a period beyond 401 weeks” was mistaken for the less accurate “no compensation is owed beyond 401 weeks.”
*9 The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Do not publish. TEX.R.APP.P. 90.
Footnotes |
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1 |
109 weeks + 292 weeks = 401 weeks (maximum period of compensation). |
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2 |
$109 per week for 109 weeks = $11,881; $37.33 per week for 292 weeks = $10,900.36; $11,881 + $10,900.36 = $22,781.36. |
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3 |
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, Sec.5 (Vernon 1987), now TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8303-6.61 (Vernon Supp. 1991). |
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4 |
5/3/84 to 4/25/86 = 722 days or 103.14 weeks. |
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5 |
5/3/84 to 4/25/86 = 722 days or 103.14 weeks. |
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