Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Mario QUINTANILLA, Appellant,
v.
TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION and K-Bin, Inc., Appellees.
No. 01-98-01326-CV.
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Nov. 4, 1999.
Panel consists of Chief Justice SCHNEIDER, and Justices TAFT and PRICE.1
OPINION
TAFT.
*1 Mario Quintanilla appealed to the district court of Brazoria County from administrative proceedings that denied him unemployment benefits. He now appeals to this Court from a summary judgment rendered in favor of the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) and Quintanilla’s former employer, K-Bin, Inc. We address whether the TWC and K-Bin established, as a matter of law, that substantial evidence supported the TWC decision. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Quintanilla worked as a process-development technician at K-Bin. K-Bin fired Quintanilla after he tested positive for Benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite, in random drug screening at the workplace. K-Bin is a wholly owned subsidiary of Shintech, Inc., which manufactures rigid vinyl compounds. K-Bin is located within Shintech’s Freeport complex and applies Shintech’s personnel policies to its employees, including a drug policy.
The following facts are undisputed:
• Quintanilla was aware of the policy and consented to random drug screening conducted under the policy;
• His urine specimen was processed normally;
• An independent laboratory confirmed and reconfirmed that his specimen tested positive for cocaine metabolites;
• An independent, licensed physician reviewed Quintanilla’s positive test results and spoke with Quintanilla about them, whereupon:
• Quintanilla denied being on any medication or undergoing any recent dental work;
• Quintanilla suggested to the physician that a tea he had purchased from an open air market in Mexico and consumed regularly might explain the positive test result;
• Quintanilla explained to the physician that his father, who regularly consumed the tea, had a similar positive test result several years before;
• The physician reported to K-Bin that he found no medical justification for the presence of the cocaine metabolite substance;
• K-Bin terminated Quintanilla temporarily and then permanently, without benefits.
After his discharge, Quintanilla applied for unemployment benefits, but was denied them for work-related misconduct. See Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 207.044(a) (Vernon 1996). The TWC Appeal Tribunal then ruled Quintanilla was entitled to benefits. K-Bin challenged this ruling before the TWC. In reversing the appeal tribunal and requiring Quintanilla to reimburse K-Bin $6,719 for benefits received, the commission concluded “the evidence presented by [K-Bin was] sufficient to establish that [Quintanilla] mismanaged his position of employment and committed misconduct connected with his last work[,]” in violation of section 201.012 of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act. Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 201.022 (Vernon 1996). On rehearing, the commissioner representing labor dissented to the decision of the chairman and the commissioner representing employers. Quintanilla challenged the decision in the court below, which rendered summary judgment in favor of the TWC and K-Bin.
Standards of Review
A. Trial-Court Review of TWC Decision
*2 The trial court reviews a TWC decision de novo to determine whether substantial evidence supports it. Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 212.201-.202(a) (Vernon 1996); Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicut, 988 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex.1998); City of Houston v. Tippy, 991 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Edwards v. Texas Employment Comm’n, 936 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ). The TWC’s ruling is presumptively valid under this standard, which places the burden on the party challenging the agency decision. Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708; Tippy, 988 S.W.2d at 333. The agency, here the TWC, remains the primary fact-finding body; whether substantial evidence supports the TWC’s decision is a question of law. Id.; Tippy, 991 S.W.2d at 333; Edwards, 936 S.W.2d at 465; see also Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 515, 529-30 (Tex.1995) (Judicial review under substantial evidence standard is to the court without a jury.).
The test is whether the TWC rendered its decision without regard to the law or the facts, and was thus unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Id. In conducting a substantial evidence review, the trial court decides whether reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the administrative agency. Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708; Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex.1984); Tippy, 991 S.W.2d at 334. To meet its burden, the party challenging the agency’s decision must produce evidence that conclusively negates all reasonable support for the agency’s decision, on any possible ground offered. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956.
Because substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance, the evidence may preponderate against the decision of the agency, but still amount to substantial evidence. Tippy, 991 S.W.2d at 334. Moreover, the reason stated for the decision is immaterial if the conclusion of the agency is correct. Texas Employment Comm’n v. Hays, 360 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex.1962). If substantial evidence supports the TWC ruling, the trial court must yield to the discretion vested in the fact-finding agency. Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civil Serv. Comm’n, 662 S.W.2d at 956; Edwards, 936 S.W.2d at 465-66; Tippy, 991 S.W.2d at 333. As in any case in which the court rules as a matter of law, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate. See Tippy, 991 S.W.2d at 334.
B. This Court’s Review of Summary Judgment
*3 This Court reviews summary judgments under well-settled principles. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c). Summary judgment is proper when a defendant establishes, as a matter of law, there are no issues of material fact concerning one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.1997); Jones v. Legal Copy, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). In reviewing a summary judgment, we will consider all summary judgment grounds on which the trial court rules that the appealing party preserves for appellate review and are necessary for final disposition of the appeal. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex.1996). We will affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories advanced in the motion for summary judgment is meritorious. Id.
“Matter of Law” Challenge to TWC Ruling
Quintanilla presents three issues for review, which he also refers to, with slight variations in phrasing, as “points of error.”
A. “Misconduct” Connected with Last Work
An individual is ineligible for unemployment benefits if he has been discharged for misconduct connected with his last work. Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 207.044(a). The following acts constitute “misconduct”:
1. mismanagement of a position of employment by action or inaction;
2. neglect that places in jeopardy the life or property of another;
3. intentional wrongdoing or malfeasance;
4. intentional violation of a law;
5. violation of a policy or rule adopted to ensure the orderly work and the safety of employees.
Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 201.012(a). In ruling adversely to Quintanilla, the TWC cited misconduct connected with his last work, under section 201.044(a) of the Labor Code, and “mismanagement,” as defined by section 201.012(a). Tex.Lab.Code Ann. §§ 201.044(a), 201.012(a)(Vernon 1996).
In moving for summary judgment, TWC and K-Bin argued they had presented substantial evidence of three of these instances of “misconduct” in the agency proceedings, as follows: (1) Quintanilla violated the K-Bin drug policy designed to ensure an orderly workplace and safety, as evidenced by his testing positive for cocaine; (2) Quintanilla’s conduct was neglect that jeopardized his coworkers’ safety and K-Bin’s property; and (3) Quintanilla’s conduct amounted to mismanagement.
1. Violation of Company Policy
Quintanilla’s first issue challenges the summary judgment rendered in favor of the TWC and K-Bin by claiming there was no substantial evidence that he violated K-Bin’s workplace policy. The policy in question is part of an Alcohol, Drug, and Contraband Interdiction Policy and states:
COMPANY POLICY STATEMENT
The use, bringing onto Company property, possession, concealment, transportation, promotion or sale of the following substances or items by any employer, vendor, contractor, their employees and invitees is strictly prohibited from all of the above-mentioned Company Premises, at any time, whether or not on duty.
*4 1) ILLEGAL DRUGS, UNAUTHORIZED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, LOOK-ALIKES, DESIGNER AND SYNTHETIC DRUGS (INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF ANY DETECTABLE AMOUNT IN THE EMPLOYEE WHILE WORKING ON COMPANY PREMISES), AND OTHER DRUGS OR ABNORMAL SUBSTANCES WHICH MAY AFFECT AN EMPLOYEE’S SENSES, MOTOR FUNCTIONS, OR ALTER A PERSON’S PERCEPTION.
(Underlined emphasis in original; bold and bold-italics emphasis added).
Quintanilla conceded he used the tea and that the random screening detected a discernable amount of cocaine, and does not dispute that the policy ensures that the orderly work and safety of K-Bin’s employees. See Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 201.012(a). Instead, Quintanilla challenges the summary judgment and the TWC’s ruling by claiming that the bolded and italicized portion of the K-Bin policy applies to all substances prohibited by the policy. Therefore, Quintanilla argues, K-Bin had to present substantial evidence to the TWC that the tea Quintanilla used affected his senses or motor functions, or altered his perception. We disagree that this language qualifies or otherwise limits the “illegal drugs” and “controlled substances” prohibited in the underlined section of the regulation.
K-Bin’s policy unequivocally prohibited “use” of “unauthorized controlled substances.” Quintanilla tested positive for cocaine in a “detectable amount” and attributed the result to tea he admitted purchasing in Mexico. In addition to admitting brewing the tea and consuming it, Quintanilla described the tea to the TWC appeals panel as containing “coca leaves.” Coca leaves or preparations containing coca leaves are “controlled” substances in Texas. Tex.Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(29)(D)(ii) (Vernon 1992). “Misconduct” that arises from violation of a company policy or rule does not require the employer to prove intent. See Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex.1986).
We conclude the trial court did not err in concluding, as matter of law, that reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the TWC, that Quintanilla violated K-Bin policy adopted to ensure the orderly work and safety of employees, by using a detectable amount of a cocaine, an illegal drug and controlled substance. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence to support the TWC’s conclusion that Quintanilla committed misconduct connected with his last work at K-Bin. TWC and K-Bin thus presented a meritorious basis in moving for summary judgment on that basis, and summary judgment in their favor was proper.
We overrule the first issue presented.
2. Mismanagement of Position of Employment
Quintanilla’s second issue challenges the summary judgment rendered in favor of the TWC and K-Bin by claiming there was no substantial evidence that he mismanaged his position of employment. We have concluded the ruling of the TWC was correct because Quintanilla violated a K-Bin policy adopted to ensure the orderly work and safety of employees. We have also concluded that the TWC and K-Bin presented a meritorious basis in moving for summary judgment based on violation of the policy, and that summary judgment was proper on that ground. Having reached those conclusions, we need not address whether the TWC and K-Bin presented substantial evidence that Quintanilla mismanaged his position of employment. See Cates, 927 S.W.2d at 626.
*5 We overrule the second issue presented.
B. Admissibility of Testing Submitted to TWC
In his third issue presented, Quintanilla claims the trial court did not give “due consideration” to a laboratory analysis of the tea, which Quintanilla submitted to the TWC. In response to a request from the trial court, the parties submitted briefing on the admissibility of the test results.
As we noted at the outset, in cases governed by the substantial evidence standard of review, fact-finding is the exclusive province of the reviewing agency, here the TWC. See Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708; Tippy, 991 S.W.2d at 333; Edwards, 936 S.W.2d at 465. Even if the trial court concluded it could review the test results, therefore, its scrutiny would have been limited to determining whether the results conclusively negated all reasonable support for the TWC’s decision-not whether the test results raised a fact issue. See Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956. Regardless, we cannot discern from the record whether the trial court considered the test results. Quintanilla has thus waived any possible error based on lack of “due consideration” of the results by not obtaining a ruling on the evidentiary issue in the court below. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a)(1)-(2); 44.1(a)(1).
We overrule the third issue presented.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Footnotes |
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1 |
The Honorable Frank C. Price, former Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas at Houston, participating by assignment. |
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