Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
Maria CASTRO, Appellant
v.
HYATT CORPORATION d/b/a Hyatt Regency Dallas and Patrice A. Flaherty, Appellees.
No. 05-95-00651-CV.
|
June 26, 1996.
Before OVARD, JAMES, and HANKINSON, JJ.
OPINION
OVARD, Justice.
*1 Maria Castro appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of Hyatt Corporation d/b/a Hyatt Regency Dallas and Patrice A. Flaherty (collectively Hyatt). In two points of error, Castro contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her causes of action for retaliatory discharge in violation of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTS
On October 20, 1990, Castro sustained an on-the-job injury while employed as a housekeeper by Hyatt. Castro filed a claim for and received workers’ compensation benefits based on that injury. Castro worked very little thereafter until September 4, 1991, when she was granted her third medical leave. That leave was extended allowing leave for sixty consecutive days from September 16, 1991 through November 16, 1991 “or until released to light duty.” Castro never requested another extension of this leave of absence.
By letter dated April 15, 1992, Flaherty, the Hyatt’s former Assistant Director of Human Relations, advised Castro that she had failed to submit a request for an extension of her leave of absence and Hyatt considered her lack of interest “a voluntary quit.” Further, Flaherty explained that Castro was considered removed pursuant to an administrative termination because she remained on leave for more than 180 days. On April 24, 1992, Castro provided Flaherty with a physician’s note releasing her to return to work with no restrictions, effective April 23, 1992. Flaherty again advised Castro that she had been removed from Hyatt’s payroll. Although Castro was eligible to reapply for a position, she refused.
Castro filed suit against Hyatt and Flaherty, asserting causes of action for retaliatory discharge in violation of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hyatt filed a motion for summary judgment asserting entitlement to judgment on the retaliatory discharge claim on the ground that, as a matter of law, there is no causal link between Castro’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits and her discharge. Hyatt asserted entitlement to judgment on Castro’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the ground that Hyatt’s conduct was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. The trial court granted Hyatt’s summary judgment motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo to determine whether a party’s right to prevail is established as a matter of law. See Capitan Enters., Inc. v. Jackson, 903 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied). An appellate court follows well-established procedures when reviewing a summary judgment:
1. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law;
2. In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true; and
*2 3. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor.
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). Summary judgment for a defendant is proper when the summary judgment evidence negates an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action as a matter of law or conclusively establishes all elements of an affirmative defense as a matter of law. See Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.1990). Once the defendant produces sufficient evidence to establish the right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produce controverting evidence raising a fact issue as to the elements negated. Torres v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex.1970); Owen Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Brite Day Constr. Inc., 821 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
In her first point of error, Castro contends the trial court erred in granting Hyatt a summary judgment because Hyatt failed to establish as a matter of law the absence of a causal connection between Castro’s termination and her workers’ compensation claim.
1. Applicable Law
Under the law in effect at the time, an employee could not be discharged or in any other manner discriminated against by any person because the employee had, among other things, filed a workers’ compensation claim in good faith. See Act of April 22, 1971, 62nd Leg., R.S., ch. 115, § 1, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 884, 884, repealed by Act of May 12, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 269, § 5, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1273 (current version at Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 451.001 (Vernon Pamph.1996)). In a summary judgment proceeding, the employer, as movant, must establish as a matter of law that the discharge had no causal link to the filing of the employee’s compensation claim. See Texas Division-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex.1994) (per curiam). The employer can meet this burden by showing a legitimate reason for the employee’s discharge. See id. at 313-14. The employee must respond with evidence raising a material issue of fact that her claim for workers’ compensation benefits was a determining factor or “causal link” in her discharge. See id. Thus, the employee’s evidence must necessarily raise a material issue of fact relating to the employer’s stated legitimate reason. See id.
2. Summary Judgment Evidence
As summary judgment evidence, Hyatt presented portions of Castro’s deposition testimony, affidavits of Flaherty and Mark Spinelli, Hyatt’s Director of Human Resources, Hyatt’s Employee Manual, and the April 15, 1992 letter Flaherty sent to Castro. That evidence showed that Hyatt has a written policy regarding leaves of absence. Leaves of absence must be requested and approved in advance and are necessary for any absence of more than five working days. A request must include a specific reason for the leave, the length of the leave, and its starting and ending dates. A physician’s statement must accompany a request for medical leave and a medical release is required for the employee to return to work following the leave. An employee may be allowed up to ninety days leave with a possible extension of ninety additional days. Seniority will be maintained for up to six months during an approved medical leave of absence. An employee will be administratively terminated if she does not return from a leave of absence before the expiration of 180 days.
*3 In her affidavit, Flaherty explained the various dates Castro was on approved leave. Both Flaherty and Spinelli in their affidavits explained that Castro’s last approved leave expired on November 16, 1991. Because Castro failed to request an extension of that leave, they determined that Castro voluntarily abandoned her employment with Hyatt. They further explained that, pursuant to Hyatt’s established leave of absence control policy, Castro was administratively terminated because she did not return to work before the expiration of 180 days from September 4, 1991, the date her leave began.
Castro’s final leave of absence request form, dated September 16, 1991, is also included in the summary judgment evidence. In it, Castro applied for leave of absence for sixty consecutive days from September 16, 1991 through November 16, 1991 or until released to light duty. The form, signed by Castro, includes the statement: “I understand and agree that: … Failure to return or to obtain an approved extension will result in termination of my employment.”
3. Discussion
It is undisputed that Castro did not get an extension to her last leave of absence and that she did not return from leave before the expiration of 180 days. Castro did not comply with Hyatt’s leave of absence policy. Hyatt established as a matter of law a legitimate reason for Castro’s termination. The burden then shifted to Castro to present summary judgment evidence raising a material issue of fact that her claim for workers’ compensation benefits was a causal link in her discharge. See Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d at 313.
In response to Hyatt’s motion, Castro filed her affidavit and portions of her deposition testimony. Castro asserts that when Flaherty and Castro’s supervisor learned she had hired an attorney to represent her in filing a workers’ compensation claim, their attitudes toward her changed. They became abrupt and generally unfriendly. Castro argues that this evidence constitutes circumstantial evidence providing a causal connection between her termination and her workers’ compensation claim. This evidence is mere speculation about Hyatt’s attitude toward Castro. Even if true, this evidence in no way controverts Hyatt’s evidence showing it had a legitimate reason to terminate Castro’s employment.
In her affidavit, Castro relies on the language of her last leave of absence request form to argue that her approved leave did not end on a date certain. She contends it extended until she was released to light-duty work. Castro asserts that by allowing her to take an open-ended leave, Hyatt deviated from its personnel policies in dealing with her. She further contends that because she reported back to work when her doctor released her, she did not violate the terms of her leave of absence. Accordingly, she argues Hyatt used the leave policy as a pretext for firing her.
In her deposition, Castro testified that she was fired and she believes she was fired because she submitted a request for workers’ compensation benefits. She stated that when the doctor released her to work, she was ready to work and although she went to Hyatt with her doctor’s release, Hyatt asserted she was no longer employed there.
*4 Castro has merely asserted her interpretation of the language in the leave of absence request form and offered her opinion as to Hyatt’s actions. Castro’s subjective beliefs are no more than conclusions and speculation and are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d at 314; Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex.1984). Castro did not controvert Hyatt’s summary judgment evidence that it considered Castro to have voluntarily quit when she did not request an extension of her last leave of absence. Further, Castro offered no evidence controverting Hyatt’s explanation that she was administratively terminated for failing to return to work before the expiration of 180 days from the date her leave began. We conclude Castro did not raise a material fact question precluding summary judgment. Because Hyatt established uncontroverted evidence that it terminated Castro for a legitimate reason and Castro offered no “causal link” evidence, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Hyatt on Castro’s cause of action for retaliatory discharge. We overrule Castro’s first point of error.
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In her second point of error, Castro asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Hyatt on her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. She contends her evidence raised fact questions about whether Hyatt’s actions constituted extreme and outrageous conduct and whether, because of that conduct, she suffers severe emotional distress and depression.
1. Applicable Law
To recover on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (3) the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress suffered was severe. See Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex.1995); Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 (Tex.1993). Conduct is considered “extreme” and “outrageous” only when it is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Randall’s Food Mkts., 891 S.W.2d at 644. Mere discharge of an employee will not support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Diamond Shamrock Refining & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.1992). Liability for intentional infliction does not extend to mere indignities, threats, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965). The trial court has the duty, in the first instance, to determine whether the alleged conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to permit recovery. See Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.1993).
2. Hyatt’s Summary Judgment Evidence
*5 In its motion for summary judgment, Hyatt asserted it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Castro could not establish that Hyatt’s conduct was extreme and outrageous or that any emotional distress suffered by Castro was severe.
Hyatt relied on Castro’s deposition testimony to support its position. In her deposition, Castro testified that Flaherty’s conduct caused her to suffer “a lot of preoccupation” thinking about what she would do. She thought she would not be able to get another job and she was distressed by the financial problems. When asked what she believed Hyatt did to intentionally inflict emotional distress on her, Castro responded, “In the fact that I wasn’t going to be well again.” She also stated, “Well, in not giving me my job back, the regular job.” When asked what emotional distress she suffered because Hyatt did not give her job back, Castro responded, “Well, I was very, very-I was in a lot of-I had a lot of feelings because I worked for the Hyatt for many years and that made me suffer a lot.”
Based on this evidence, we conclude Hyatt merely discharged Castro. Hyatt’s actions did not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct for purposes of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See Randall’s Food Mkts., 891 S.W.2d at 644. Further, the evidence shows that, as a matter of law, while Castro was upset, any emotional distress she suffered was not severe. Accordingly, Hyatt proved as a matter of law that Castro could not succeed on her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The burden then shifted to Castro to present evidence raising a fact question. Torres, 457 S.W.2d at 52.
3. Castro’s Summary Judgment Response
In her response, Castro asserted that Hyatt’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. She stated that when she returned to work with doctor imposed light-duty restrictions, Hyatt (1) did not assign her to light-duty work, (2) refused to grant her medical leave, (3) refused to allow her to go home, and (4) threatened to fire her if she did not do the heavy work or if she requested a leave of absence and went home. She also asserted that she suffers severe emotional distress as a result of Hyatt’s actions.
In addition to her deposition testimony, Castro relies on her affidavit to support these contentions. In her affidavit, she stated that in June of 1991, when she returned to work with light-duty restrictions, she was initially given light duty but then returned to heavy-duty work for no apparent reason. Occasionally her supervisor would refuse to allow her to go home, even though the supervisor knew she was in pain. She said she was led to believe that if she left without completing her assigned work, she would be fired. She said this caused her severe emotional distress and depression.
Assuming the allegations in Castro’s affidavit are true, the conduct she describes amounts to, at most, mere indignities and petty oppressions. Castro did not present evidence raising a fact question as to whether Hyatt’s actions were extreme and outrageous or whether the emotional distress she suffered was severe. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Hyatt on Castro’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We overrule Castro’s second point of error.
*6 We affirm the trial court’s judgment.