Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
Velma MANNING, Appellant,
v.
ALCATEL NETWORK SYSTEMS, INC., Appellee.
No. 05-97-01933-CV.
|
Dec. 14, 1999.
Before Justices OVARD, JAMES, and BRIDGES.
OPINION
JAMES.
*1 Velma Manning appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Alcatel Network Systems, Inc. (Alcatel) on her employment discrimination cause of action. In her second point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations because she presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she received unequivocal notice of her termination in August 1992. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting Alcatel’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, we overrule appellant’s four points of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to appellant’s original petition, filed August 1, 1996, Alcatel “terminated [appellant] in retaliation based upon her filing a workers’ compensation claim relating to her injuries” suffered “on the job….” Alcatel thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, among other grounds, appellant’s “retaliatory discharge claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” Alcatel contended appellant’s cause of action accrued on August 5, 1992 because appellant testified during her deposition she was terminated by Alcatel that day. Alcatel further argued that even if appellant was not officially terminated until she received a letter dated August 5, 1994 and appellant had merely been on a medical leave of absence since August 5, 1992, her cause of action still accrued on August 5, 1992 under the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.1996). Therefore, Alcatel claimed appellant’s cause of action was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Alcatel attached excerpts of appellant’s deposition testimony. According to appellant, on August 5, 1992, “Mr. Gaddy [Alcatel’s plant manager] gave … the order to take my badge and terminate me….” Appellant further testified she considered herself “terminated” and her “badge was taken” in August 1992. Alcatel also attached excerpts of appellant’s deposition testimony given during the pendency of appellant’s federal court cause of action against Alcatel. In response to the question “When were you terminated from employment with Alcatel Network Systems?” appellant replied “August 5th, 1992.”
The order granting Alcatel’s motion for summary judgment does not specify the grounds relied on for the ruling. Appellant filed a motion for new trial and timely perfected this appeal. In her second point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of Alcatel based on the expiration of the statute of limitations because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether she received unequivocal notice of her termination in August 1992.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
*2 This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo to determine whether a party’s right to prevail is established as a matter of law. See Foreness v. Hexamer, 971 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. denied), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 240 (1998). The standards for reviewing a summary judgment are well established: (1) the movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.1997).
When, as here, the summary judgment order does not specify the grounds relied on for the ruling, the reviewing court will affirm the trial court’s judgment if any one of the grounds advanced in the motion is meritorious. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex.1993); see also Banfield v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., 977 S.W.2d 434, 439 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied) (noting non-movant must negate all grounds asserted in the motion for summary judgment when the order granting the motion is silent as to the ground upon which judgment was granted). In addition, “[w]hen summary judgment is sought based on the expiration of limitations, the movant must conclusively establish the limitations bar and must conclusively negate any tolling or suspension statute raised by the nonmovant.” Guardia v. Kontos, 961 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (emphasis omitted).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Section 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code provides, in pertinent part, an employer may not discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because the employee has filed a workers’ compensation claim in good faith. See Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 451.001 (Vernon 1996). A cause of action under section 451.001 of the labor code “must be filed within two years after such cause of action accrues.” See Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc. v. Sanchez, 924 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.1996) (construing previous version of section 451.001); see also Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp.2000) (a person must bring suit for personal injury “not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues.”). Therefore, to determine whether appellant timely filed her section 451.001 claim, we must first ascertain when the claim accrued. See Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 924 S.W.2d at 927.
In Johnson & Johnson Medical, the Texas Supreme Court held the employee’s wrongful termination cause of action “accrues when the employee receives unequivocal notice of his or her termination or when a reasonable person should have known of his or her termination.” See id. at 928. The court reiterated its prior holding that when determining the time at which a cause of action accrues, the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts result in termination. See id. at 929 (citing Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex.1996)). Although the court concluded an “indefinite medical layoff” did not constitute notice of the employee’s termination, the facts in the instant case are easily distinguishable from the facts presented in Johnson & Johnson Medical. See id. at 928-29.
DISCUSSION
*3 In the present case, appellant has repeatedly testified she was terminated by Alcatel on August 5, 1992. Therefore, appellant obviously had “unequivocal notice” of her termination on August 5, 1992, and her cause of action accrued on that date. See Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 924 S.W.2d at 927-28. As stated above, a cause of action under section 451.001 of the Texas Labor Code must be filed within two years after such claim accrues. See id. Appellant did not file her lawsuit against Alcatel until August 1, 1996, almost four years after the date her cause of action accrued.
Consequently, we conclude Alcatel, as the movant for summary judgment, conclusively established the statute of limitations bar on appellant’s claim. See Guardia, 961 S.W.2d at 583. The trial court properly granted Alcatel’s summary judgment motion on this ground, and we overrule appellant’s second point of error. Because we conclude the trial court correctly granted Alcatel’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations period, we need not address appellant’s remaining points of error. See Banfield, 977 S.W.2d at 439; see also Davila v.. Lockwood, 933 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ) (overruling appellant’s point of error without considering the other grounds for summary judgment because the trial court could have properly granted summary judgment on the limitations defense). Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s four points of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.