Title: 

Holloway v. Compass Sec.

Date: 

April 20, 2004

Citation: 

05-03-00563-CV

Court: 

Status: 

Unpublished Opinion

No History

Table of Contents

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Dallas.

Margaret HOLLOWAY, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of David Holloway, Appellant

v.

COMPASS SECURITY, Appellee.

No. 05–03–00563–CV.

|

April 20, 2004.

Attorneys & Firms

Antonio Olvera, for Margaret Holloway.

Andrew L. Jones, for Compass Security.

Before Justices MORRIS, FITZGERALD, and FRANCIS.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion by Justice FRANCIS.

*1 Margaret Holloway sued Compass Security for destroying evidence she contends is necessary to prove a workers’ compensation claim involving the death of her husband. When Compass did not answer her lawsuit, Holloway moved for a default judgment. After reviewing the pleadings and hearing evidence, the trial judge denied the default judgment and dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim.

In a single issue, Holloway asserts her petition did state a cognizable cause of action: tortious interference with prospective property rights. We disagree with Holloway’s argument and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Holloway’s original petition alleges she was damaged by Compass’s “tortious conduct … [i]n destroying the employee manual which described the duties of Holloway at the site where he was working on the day he was killed.” She characterizes her claim as “tortious interference with prospective property interest.” Regardless of this characterization or the arguments she asserts with respect to third-party beneficiary rights, this lawsuit involves nothing more than the alleged destruction of evidence.

The Texas Supreme Court has held “[b]ecause we determine that spoliation does not give rise to independent damages, and because it is better remedied within the lawsuit affected by spoliation, we decline to recognize spoliation as a tort cause of action.” See Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex.1998). Because spoliation is not a recognized cause of action, the trial judge did not err in denying Holloway’s motion for default judgment and in dismissing Holloway’s claim.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.