Court of Appeals of Texas,

Dallas.

David ETTER, Appellant,

v.

POTOMAC INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Appellee.

No. 05-02-00361-CV.

|

July 29, 2003.

Attorneys & Firms

David Charles Etter, pro se.

Christopher J. Ameel and Charles Edwin Morse, for Potomac Insurance Company of Illinois.

Before Chief Justice THOMAS and Justices WHITTINGTON and O’NEILL.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice THOMAS.

*1 In this workers’ compensation case, David Etter appeals the trial court’s order granting Potomac Insurance Company of Illinois’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Because the factual nature of the case as well as its procedural history are well known to the parties, we do not recount these in detail. Appellant filed an original petition seeking review of a Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission decision that denied his claim because appellant failed to establish that he (1) had sustained a compensable injury, (2) had a disability, and (3) timely reported his claimed injury. Subsequently, appellee filed a traditional motion for summary judgment and a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted both motions. On appeal, appellant challenges only the trial court’s granting of the no-evidence motion and ancillary rulings related to that motion.

Before addressing the merits of his complaint, we note that appellant represented himself both at trial and on appeal and appears to suggest that this Court should allow some leniency because of his status. However, pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys, and they must comply with all applicable rules of procedure. Foster v. Williams, 74 S.W.3d 200, 202 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied); Clemens v. Allen, 47 S.W.3d 26, 28 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.); Chandler v. Chandler, 991 S.W.2d 367, 379 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied); In re Estate of Dilasky, 972 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.). No allowance is made because a litigant is not an attorney. Foster, 74 S.W.3d at 202. If pro se litigants were held to a lesser standard, they would be given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel. Id.

With that said, we turn to question of whether we must reverse the trial court’s no-evidence summary judgment order in this case. As said previously, in addition to the no-evidence motion, appellee also filed a traditional motion for summary judgment asserting appellant did not suffer a compensable injury and did not timely report his injury to his employer. Appellant has not challenged the propriety of the trial court’s order granting this motion.

When the trial court does not specify the basis for its ruling, it is appellant’s burden on appeal to show that each of the independent grounds asserted in support of summary judgment is insufficient to support summary judgment. See Williams v. Crum & Forster Comm’l Ins., 915 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995), rev’d on other grounds, U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.1997); Cullen Frost Bank v. Commonwealth Lloyd’s Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993), writ denied per curiam, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.1994).

Here, appellant was entitled to present argument on all grounds upon which he contends summary judgment was improper. See Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.1970). However, he had not done so. Specifically, appellant did not challenge at all the trial court’s order granting a traditional summary judgment or the grounds contained in appellee’s motion. Thus, even if this Court were to conclude the no-evidence motion was improperly granted, appellant has failed to challenge the remaining order and the grounds upon which it was based. Thus, he cannot obtain a reversal of the judgment. See Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 23 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (because summary judgment may have been granted, properly or improperly, on grounds not challenged by appellant, we must affirm summary judgment).

*2 Moreover, even assuming appellant had challenged the traditional motion for summary judgment, that motion was based on deemed admissions. Prior to the summary judgment hearing, appellant filed a motion seeking a continuation and a motion to extend the scheduling order deadlines. In this motion, appellant requested that “the Scheduling Order deadlines and any outstanding discovery requests and interrogatories be extended ninety days.” On the day of the summary judgment hearing, he filed a second motion, seeking among other things to file responses to discovery. The motion does not specify any particular discovery nor does it request withdrawal or amendment of the deemed admissions.

Once admissions are deemed they become judicial admissions and the matter admitted is conclusively established, and the admitting party may not introduce controverting evidence in any legal proceeding related to the same action. Shaw v. Nat’l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ). Deemed admissions may be employed as summary judgment proof. Elkins v. Jones, 613 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1981, no writ).

Among the admissions deemed against appellant were that appellant did not sustain a compensable injury, did not suffer a disability as a result of a compensable injury, and failed to timely report his injury to his employer. These admissions entitled appellee to summary judgment.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.