Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT and Gary Burns, Appellants,

v.

Anthony HERNANDEZ, Appellee.

No. 05-98-00351-CV.

|

Aug. 8, 2000.

Before Justices KINKEADE, MOSELEY, and POFF.¹

OPINION

POFF

*1 In this interlocutory appeal, Anthony Hernandez, a temporary employee, sued Dallas Independent School District and Gary Burns (collectively “DISD”) for alleged retaliation against Hernandez for filing a workers’ compensation claim. DISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction which the trial court denied. In one point of error, DISD contends the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because Hernandez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. We reverse the trial court’s order denying DISD’s the plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing the case.

Plea To The Jurisdiction

1. Standard of Review

In a plea to the jurisdiction, a party contests the trial court’s authority to determine the subject matter of the cause of action. See Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Garrett Place, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.). The plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts affirmatively showing the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 142-43. Because the question of subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question, we review the trial court’s ruling de novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998). We must determine whether the party bringing suit has met its burden of pleading facts showing the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over the pending controversy. See Garrett, 972 S.W .2d at 142-43. In this context, we take allegations in the pleadings as true and construe them in favor of the pleader. See Hudman, 996 S.W.2d at 910.

2. Applicable Law

In its sole point of error, DISD contends the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because Hernandez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. According to Hernandez, he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies because he was a temporary employee.

Texas requires an aggrieved party to first exhaust all remedies provided under the statutory administrative scheme if the subject matter (1) concerns the administration of school laws, and (2) involves questions of fact. See Jones v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 872 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied). Employment disputes generally involve questions of fact requiring an aggrieved party to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Barrientos v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 881 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, no writ). In this context, an employee who alleges a school district wrongfully terminated his employment contract must apply to the school authorities for relief before filing suit in the district court. See Mitchison v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Jones, 872 S.W.2d at 296. A party is not required to exhaust administrative remedies only when: (1) the exhaustion of administrative remedies will cause irreparable injury or administrative remedies are inadequate; (2) an administrative agency acts without authority; or (3) a plaintiff raises Title 42 or constitutional claims. See Jones, 872 S.W.2d at 296; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2000). The failure of a party to exhaust his administrative remedies deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. See Jones, 872 S.W.2d at 297.

*2 Hernandez’s claims do not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to allow him to avoid exhausting his statutory administrative remedies. Hernandez does not allege DISD violated his constitutional rights or that his claims arise under Title 42. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2000). Further, nothing in the record suggests that an administrative appeal would have caused Hernandez irreparable injury. While Hernandez claims DISD policy does not specifically state that temporary employees have a right to a hearing regarding dismissals from employment, upon reviewing the record we find DISD policy provides all employees are entitled to a hearing. Further, Hernandez concedes he never pursued his administrative remedies. Because a school employee who alleges wrongful termination must apply to the school authorities for relief before seeking the jurisdiction of a district court, we conclude Hernandez was not entitled to seek relief in the trial court. See Mitchison, 803 S.W.2d at 773. We further conclude that because Hernandez did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the county court at law had no subject matter jurisdiction and therefore improperly denied DISD’s plea to the jurisdiction. See Jones, 872 S.W.2d at 297. We sustain Hernandez’s sole point of error.

We reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment dismissing the case.

	Footnotes
1		The Honorable H. Bryan Poff, Jr., Retired Justice, Court of Appeals, Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo, sitting by assignment.