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Title: 

Dallas Independent School Dist. v. Hadamek

Date: 

August 9, 1995

Citation: 

05-94-01228-CV

Court: 

  • 5th COA – Dallas

Status: 

Unpublished Opinion

No History

Table of Contents

  • Dallas Independent School Dist. v. Hadamek

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant

v.

Donna HADAMEK, Appellee.

05-94-01228-CV.

|

Aug. 9, 1995.

Before BAKER, CHAPMAN and DEVANY, JJ.

OPINION

CHAPMAN.

*1 Dallas Independent School District (DISD) sued Donna Hadamek to recover benefits it paid Hadamek under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The trial court granted a partial summary judgment in DISD’s favor on the issues of liability and damages. After a hearing, the trial court reduced DISD’s recoverable damages by permitting a contribution credit from a settling codefendant. In five points of error, DISD generally contends the trial court erred in crediting the judgment. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

DISD is a self-insured employer under the workers’ compensation laws. Hadamek was injured in the course of her employment with DISD. DISD paid Hadamek workers’ compensation benefits as a result of her injuries.

A dentist performed oral surgery on Hadamek for her injuries. Hadamek sued the dentist for malpractice she alleged he committed in her treatment. Hadamek settled her claim with the dentist but did not inform DISD of the settlement or reimburse DISD for the workers’ compensation benefits it paid her.

DISD sued Hadamek under article 8307, section 6a of the Workers’ Compensation Act to recover the “first money” she received in her settlement with the dentist.1 DISD also sought a permanent injunction enjoining Hadamek from spending future payments due from the dentist under the settlement agreement. In the same suit, DISD sued Lindsey & Newsom, DISD’s risk manager, who administered DISD’s self-insurance plan. DISD alleged Lindsey & Newsom was negligent in handling Hadamek’s claim. DISD also alleged causes of action for breach of contract and DTPA violations.

DISD filed a motion for summary judgment alleging it was, as a matter of law, entitled to the “first money” Hadamek received in her settlement with the dentist. Subsequently, DISD settled its claim with Lindsey & Newsom and the trial court dismissed Lindsey & Newsom from the lawsuit with prejudice. Hadamek amended her answer asserting that if she is found liable to DISD, she is entitled to a credit based on the settlement between DISD and Lindsey & Newsom.

The trial court granted DISD a partial summary judgment concluding DISD was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues of liability and damages. In the partial summary judgment, a hearing was set to determine the remaining issues of: (1) whether Hadamek was entitled to a credit for the proceeds DISD received in its settlement with Lindsey & Newsom; and (2) whether DISD should be granted injunctive relief.

At the hearing on the remaining issues, the trial court found: (1) DISD suffered the same injury by Lindsey & Newsom’s conduct as was caused by Hadamek’s conduct; (2) Hadamek was entitled to a credit against the judgment in the amount DISD already received from Lindsey & Newsom; and (3) DISD was entitled injunctive relief.

AMOUNT OF DISD’S RECOVERY

In its first point of error, DISD contends the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment that “did not include every item of relief” it requested. DISD maintains that because it conclusively established its damages, the trial court erred in crediting the judgment. We disagree.

*2 An injured party is entitled to only one satisfaction for her injuries. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex.1991). This rule prevents a plaintiff from obtaining more than one recovery for the same injury. Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 702 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied) The one satisfaction rule applies in situations where the defendants commit the same act and where the defendants commit technically differing acts that result in a single injury. Stewart Title, 822 S.W.2d at 7. The rule reduces a nonsettling defendant’s liability for damages by allowing a credit against the defendant’s adverse judgment for the amount of any settlement entered into by a codefendant. Byrd, 891 S.W.2d at 702.

Application of a credit under the one satisfaction rule does not affect a party’s liability for its wrongful acts or the assessment of damages against the party. Byrd, 891 S.W.2d. at 702. A finding of damages does not necessarily mean the plaintiff may recover them. Byrd, 891 S.W.2d at 702. The one satisfaction rule operates to determine a plaintiff’s recoverable damages. Byrd, 891 S.W.2d at 702. Any credit for settlements made by other tortfeasors must be applied after the trier of fact determines a party’s liability. Byrd, 891 S.W.2d at 702. Thus, the determination of a defendant’s right to a credit is separate and distinct from the determination of a plaintiff’s damages.

In this case, the trial court determined Hadamek was liable to DISD as a matter of law on the issues of liability and damages. The trial court’s partial summary judgment includes all the damages DISD conclusively established in its motion for summary judgment. The trial court, however, specifically reserved the issue of Hadamek’s claim for a credit to be determined at a later hearing. At that hearing, the trial court credited the judgment in the amount DISD recovered from Lindsey & Newsom. The determination of Hadamek’s right to credit was a separate issue, which the trial court decided after it determined DISD’s damages. DISD has not shown how or why its evidence on damages would preclude the credit. In fact, the amount of DISD’s damages is not relevant to Hadamek’s right to credit. Cf. Byrd, 891 S.W.2d at 702. We overrule DISD’s first point of error.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In its second through fifth points of error, DISD contends the evidence is factually and legally insufficient to support the credit. DISD relies on its summary judgment evidence and Hadamek’s lack thereof to support its contention. DISD argues that no evidence was presented prior to the trial court’s entry of the partial summary judgment to support the credit. The record shows that after the trial court granted DISD’s motion for summary judgment, it held a hearing to determine Hademek’s entitlement to the credit. Notably, DISD has not argued that Hadamek failed to prove the credit at this later hearing.

The record before us does not contain a statement of facts from the hearing in which the trial court determined Hadamek’s right to credit. It is the appellant’s burden to bring forth a sufficient record to show reversible error. See Tex.R.App. P. 50(d). An appeal on an evidentiary matter without a statement of facts presents nothing for review. Guthrie v. Nat’l Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex.1965); Radio Station WQCK v. T.M. Commun., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, no writ). We must presume the trial court heard sufficient evidence to support its decision.2 DeSai v. Islas, 884 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994, writ denied). Accordingly, we overrule DISD’s second through fifth points of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Footnotes

1

See Act of May 15, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 88, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 193, amended by Act of June 8, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 326, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen Laws 1387, repealed by Act of December 13, 1989, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1.

2

We recognize that an appellant need not bring forth a statement of facts from a hearing if no evidence was presented at the hearing. However, for an appellant to be relieved of its burden to bring forth a statement of facts, the appellant must show no evidence was presented at the hearing. See Humphreys v. Caldwell, 881 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ). DISD has not shown no evidence was presented at the hearing such to relieve it of its burden to bring forth a statement of facts.