Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Deloris PHILLIPS, Appellant

v.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, Fleming Foods, Inc., Core-Mark Holding Co., the Raymond Corp., Cigna Insurance Co., Bankers Standard Insurance Co., Esis-Chubb Management Corp., Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., United Parcel Service, Inc., Teamsters Local Union 767, City of Dallas Municipality, Dallas County Muncipality, and Dallas Police Department, Appellees

No. 05-22-00120-CV

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Opinion Filed April 19, 2022

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Rehearing En Banc Denied June 16, 2022

Attorneys & Firms

Deloris Phillips, Pro Se.

David L. Brenner, Burns Anderson Jury & Brenner, LLC, Austin, Robert Reginald Graves Jr., Law Office of Robert Graves, Austin, for Appellee Bankers Standard Insurance.

Stephanie Laird Tolson, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Houston, for Appellee Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company.

Devin Q. Alexander, Dallas City Attorney’s Office, Dallas, Tatia Wilson, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Houston, for Appellee City of Dallas Municipality.

Todd Keith Sellars, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Dallas, for Appellee Dallas County Municipality.

Christopher M. Losey, Downs & Stanford PC, Dallas, for Appellee Liberty Mutual Insurance.

Francis H. LoCoco, Chalon N. Clark, for Appellee Raymond Forklift Trucks.

Jamie King Harrison, James Roddy Tanner, Tanner and Associates PC, Fort Worth, for Appellee Teamsters Local Union 767.

Dennis M. McKinney, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Austin, for Appellee Texas Department of Insurance-Division of Workers Compensation.

Shannon Brown Schmoyer, Schmoyer Reinhard LLP, San Antonio, for Appellee United Parcel Service, Inc.

Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Goldstein, and Justice Smith

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice Burns

*1 Appellant appeals from the trial court’s January 31, 2022 interlocutory order granting the Rule 91a motion to dismiss filed by The Raymond Corporation, one of numerous defendants. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a. Generally, this Court has jurisdiction only over final judgments and certain interlocutory orders as permitted by statute. See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (listing appealable interlocutory orders). A final judgment is one that disposes of all parties and claims. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. Because the appealed order did not appear to be a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, we questioned our jurisdiction over the appeal and instructed the parties to file letter briefs addressing the issue.

In her letter briefs filed on April 1 and April 18, appellant fails to address the lack of a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order. Rather, appellant asserts, without explanation, that the reporter’s record¹ will “factually validate” our jurisdiction over the appeal. Also, without explanation, appellant cites to this Court’s opinion in Dezoete v. Raymond Corp., No. 05-19-01301-CV, 2020 WL 7382302, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 16, 2020, no pet.). Dezoete is not applicable because it involved an appeal from a final judgment over which we had jurisdiction.

The order appealed is interlocutory because it does not dispose of appellant’s claims against all parties. Appellant has not provided any authority demonstrating that the order is otherwise appealable and nothing before us reflects the reporter’s record would assist us. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

	Footnotes
1		We suspended the deadline for the reporter’s record pending determination of our jurisdiction over the appeal.