This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 16, 1995, in Houston, Texas. In response to the issues before her, the hearing officer determined that: (1) respondent (claimant) had disability from June 20, 1994, to the present from her ___________, injury; (2) the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission improperly designated a second designated doctor; (3) claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) per the first designated doctor’s report; and (4) because claimant had not reached MMI, the determination of an impairment rating (IR) was premature. On appeal, appellant (carrier) contends the hearing officer erred in determining that claimant had disability. Claimant did not respond on appeal.
DECISION
We affirm.
The parties stipulated that claimant sustained a compensable injury on ___________ while working for ______________ (employer). A medical report indicates that she said she injured her back because she had uncomfortable seating arrangements and also because she had to walk up and down ten flights of stairs while carrying files. The evidence in the record conflicted regarding claimant’s current physical state and whether she had recovered enough to return to work. A February 22, 1995, letter from Dr. DeFrancesco (Dr. D) states that an MRI showed mild disc bulging and degenerative changes at L5-S1 without evidence of focal herniation.
Disability means the “inability because of a compensable injury to obtain and retain employment at wages equivalent to the preinjury wage.” Section 401.011(16). Disability, by definition, depends upon there being a compensable injury. Id. The question of whether the claimant has disability is a fact question and may be established by the testimony of the claimant, alone, if found credible. Gee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 765 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. 1989); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 91083, decided January 6, 1992. A restricted release to work, as opposed to an unrestricted release, is evidence that the effects of the injury remain and that disability continues. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92432, decided October 5, 1992. An employee under a conditional work release does not have the burden of proving his inability to work. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 941566, decided January 4, 1995. Where a claimant is released to light-duty work, there is no requirement that the claimant look for work and the claimant does not have to show that work was not available. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 941092, decided September 28, 1994; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 951278, decided September 13, 1995.
Carrier contends that the hearing officer’s disability finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence because the evidence showed claimant was able to work and that she had been released to return to work. In this case, claimant testified that she still had pain and that she has not returned to work. There are several Specific and Subsequent Medical Reports (TWCC-64) contained in the record dated from February 1994 to May 1995 from claimant’s treating doctor, Dr. W (Dr. W), that state that claimant “is not to work.” Although there is evidence that some doctors reported that claimant exhibited inappropriate behavior regarding her pain and some doctors said claimant could return to full-duty work, there is also evidence from other medical professionals that she was unable to deal with her pain and that she could return to only light-duty work, or that she was not to work.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that there was evidence from which the hearing officer could conclude that claimant’s disability continues. Appeal No. 951278, supra. Based on claimant’s testimony about her continuing problems, the evidence that she should not work, and the evidence regarding the light-duty releases, the hearing officer could find that claimant’s disability continued to the date of the CCH. This disability determination is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and we will not disturb her finding, given our standard of review. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). The fact that the evidence could have allowed different inferences under the state of the evidence does not provide a sufficient basis for reversing the hearing officer’s decision. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92308, decided August 20, 1992.
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision and order.
Judy L. Stephens – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Lynda H. Nesenholtz – Appeals Judge