This appeal arises under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act of 1989 (1989 Act), TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8308-1.01 through 11.10 and 8309h (Vernon Supp. 1993). On April 20, 1993, a contested case hearing was held in (city), Texas, with (hearing officer) presiding. He determined that appellant (claimant) did not have carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of her work for the city. Claimant appeals stating that three doctors diagnosed carpel tunnel syndrome and that the evidence supports a finding of compensable injury. Respondent (city-carrier) replies that the medical evidence did not show carpal tunnel injury.
DECISION
Finding that the decision and order are supported by sufficient evidence, we affirm.
In 1981, claimant began working for the city. Since 1988, she worked with police records as a data entry clerk. She worked five or more hours a day at data entry and did other tasks, such as cross-checking and filing. She testified that in August or September 1992 she noticed that her pace slowed and her hands were tired; she did not relate it to work at that time. In October 1992 she had increased pain in the wrist and arm, and in November 1992 the pain was more continuous. Claimant said that in that month she told a supervisor of the pain but was told not to worry about it.
Claimant testified that she then saw her doctor in late January 1993 who diagnosed her pregnancy. She told him of the problem with her hands. He referred her to (Dr. C). She saw Dr. C in early February 1993, and he performed a test of her arms. Dr. C referred her to (Dr. P); Dr. P made a report which, along with Dr. C’s note, was offered into evidence. Claimant stated that she has not been back to work since the end of January 1993. She described the pain as in the hands to the elbows; she said she cannot pick up heavy things or small things. She can do some light housework but does not drive a car anymore. Her hands and arms were also described as numb in the same areas as is the pain. She added that her doctor told her to crochet as good exercise for her problem. She also said that she was scheduled to see Dr. P again and he had not released her to go back to work.
Dr. C states in his report that he saw claimant on February 1, 1993. He describes her history of pain in her wrists and arms. He did a physical examination and found “[n]o muscle wasting or weakness noted in all four limbs; no sensory deficit noted . . . I have subsequently carried out nerve conduction and E.M.G. studies, which give no evidence for a lower motor neuron lesion. However, the symptoms suggest carpal tunnel syndrome on both sides.”
Medical data from Dr. P is limited to the Initial Medical Report he filed with the Commission. In the “history” section of this form, Dr. P notes the symptoms of pain and numbness and states, “she underwent an EMG nerve conduction test carried out by [Dr. C] which shows bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. (emphasis added.) Dr. P did not find any wasting of muscles. Dr. P took claimant off work and diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
A (Dr. J) performed a physical exam in March 1993 on claimant for the city-carrier. He found that claimant had zero percent use of both her right and left arms and hands, noting tenderness and “marked limitation of movement on left, moderate on right.” While he said that she could not use her hands for any kind of work, he did not diagnose or mention carpal tunnel syndrome or offer any opinion as to the cause for the limitation in the use of her hands; he did confirm the diagnosis of pregnancy.
(Dr. R) examined claimant on April 13, 1993 at the suggestion of the city-carrier. As part of her history, claimant related her pain and inability to move her hands; she mentioned that Dr. P took her off work but that “her physician” told her to crochet for exercise. Dr. R then comments that such exercise would be an “unusual activity” to recommend if the doctor were concerned with carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. R characterized claimant’s situation as “a very unusual presentation.” Dr. R recorded:
She expresses extreme pain with light touch of the hands; however, later in the examination with firm palpation, she states that this is not painful whatsoever. The sensory examination was also very confusing with her stating that she has spotty, dime-sized areas of numbness which certainly do not follow any kind of neurologic pattern that would be associated with carpal tunnel syndrome.
Dr. R also commented concerning claimant’s inability to get undressed for the examination and her need of assistance; “however, she was noted then to hyperextend her wrist to pull up her bra strap.” Dr. R noted the records of claimant as including an EMG of February 1, 1993, that “was normal and showed no evidence of a lower motor neurolesion.” (See Dr. P’s conflicting statement about this test, supra.) Dr. R concluded by advising that claimant should be more active with her hands but not to “hyperflex or hyperextend her wrist.”
The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Article 8308-6.34(e) of the 1989 Act. As the trier of fact, he can choose to give more weight to one doctor’s opinion than to another’s opinion. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Gant, 346 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ). In deciding that claimant did not show that she had carpal tunnel syndrome from typing at work, the hearing officer could have given more weight to the EMG test as described by Dr. C and Dr. R (normal) than as described by Dr. P (bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome). The strongest statement of Dr. C was “symptoms suggest carpal tunnel syndrome,” but Dr. C also said that nerve conduction studies and EMG provide no evidence of a lesion. Dr. C did not diagnose carpal tunnel syndrome. While the hearing officer does not have to have objective data to find an injury (see Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92300, dated August 13, 1992), he may consider the results of any test when available. Dr. J in his physical examination, done for the city, does note claimant’s inability to use her hands and his examination could support a finding of injury; however, he does not describe his testing or observations of claimant’s conduct with the detail that Dr. R provided in the examination she conducted. The comments of Dr. R concerning sensory responses that are not associated with carpal tunnel syndrome, and her other observations of claimant’s “unusual” responses, together with the normal results of tests conducted by Dr. C, provide a sufficient basis to support the hearing officer’s finding that carpal tunnel syndrome was not shown.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and are affirmed.
Joe Sebesta – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge