Title: 

APD 93563

Significant Decision

Date: 

August 1, 1993

Issues: 

Unavailable

Table of Contents

APD 93563

Pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 8308-1.01 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 1993) (1989 Act), a contested case hearing was held in (city), Texas, on May 28, 1993, (hearing officer) presiding as hearing officer. He concluded that claimant did not sustain an injury in the course and scope of her employment on (date of injury); that she did not have disability; and that she was not entitled to temporary income benefits (TIBS). The appellant, claimant herein, appeals these conclusions of law. There is no indication of service on the respondent, a statutorily self-insured governmental entity, school herein, by claimant as required by Tex. W. C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 143.3(a)(4) (Rule 143.3(a)(4)). Records of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) indicate that the Commission faxed a copy of claimant’s request for review to counsel for school on July 8, 1993, and counsel for the school has submitted a reply in which he urges, alternatively, either affirmance of the hearing officer’s decision or dismissal of the appeal as untimely.

DECISION

Finding that the request for review was not timely filed and the jurisdiction of the Appeals Panel has not been properly invoked, the decision of the hearing officer has become final pursuant to the provision of Articles 8308-6.34(h) and 8308-6.41(a).

Article 8308-6.41(a) provides that a party desiring to appeal the decision of the hearing officer shall file a written appeal with the Appeals Panel and serve a copy on the other party not later than the 15th day after the date the hearing officer’s decision is received from the Commission’s hearings division. Rule 143.3(a) provides that a request for review be filed with the Commission’s central office in (city) not later than the 15th day after receipt of the hearing officer’s decision. Rule 143.3(c) provides that a request shall be presumed to be timely filed if it is mailed on or before the 15th day after the date of receipt of the hearing officer’s decision, and is received by the Commission not later than the 20th day after such date. At the conclusion of the contested case hearing, the hearing officer expressly advised the parties that if they wished to appeal his decision, they must do so no later that the 15th day after they received his decision.

The hearing officer’s decision in this case, signed on June 3, 1993, was distributed by the Commission’s hearing division on June 11, 1993. Claimant does not indicate the date she received the decision and thus we apply Rule 102.5(h) which provides, in part, that “the commission shall deem the received date to be five days after the date mailed.” Accordingly, claimant is deemed to have received the decision on June 16,1993, and her appeal was required to be transmitted to the Appeals Panel not later than 15 days later, that is, on July 1, 1993.

The claimant’s handwritten request for review, inexplicably dated April 5, 1993, was post-marked July 7, 1993, and received by the Commission on July 8, 1993. We conclude the appeal is untimely.

Although not necessary to our decision, we have nonetheless examined the record in this case to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s determinations on the matter submitted for appeal. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission appeal No. 92080, April 14, 1992. In this regard, we note that claimant’s sole rationale on appeal is: “I do not agree with the decision.” The claimant has the burden of establishing that an injury occurred. This is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the hearing officer based on his evaluation of the evidence. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. “The hearing officer is entitled to believe all or part or none of the testimony of any one witness.” Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93426, decided July 7, 1993. The hearing officer decided the issue of whether the claimant sustained an injury in the course and scope of her employment against the claimant. Although only the claimant testified at the hearing, other evidence, primarily in the form of affidavits, contradicted the claimant’s version of events surrounding the alleged injury. Thus, it appears there was sufficient evidence on which the hearing officer could base his findings. Under these circumstances, had our jurisdiction been invoked, we would have concluded that his findings concerning injury in the course and scope of employment are not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1951); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93360, decided June 23,1993.

The request for review having been determined to be untimely, the jurisdiction of the Appeals Panel has not been properly invoked. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92099, decided May 21, 1992. Accordingly, the decision of the hearing officer is the final administrative decision in this case.

Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge

Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge