This case returns to the Appeals Panel following remand to allow for reconstruction of certain evidence which was missing from the record of the case. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93228, decided May 12, 1993. Hearing officer (hearing officer). convened a contested case hearing on July 28, 1993, in (city), Texas, to reconstruct the record with regard to four photographs which had been received into evidence at the first contested case hearing on January 14, 1993. At the close of the second hearing, the hearing officer reviewed the record in the case and found no basis for changing his original decision and order, that the appellant (hereinafter claimant) failed to establish that he was injured in the course and scope of his employment on (date of injury), and is entitled to no benefits under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (formerly Article 8308-1.01 et seq.) (1989 Act). The claimant asks that this panel reverse that determination on appeal, while the respondent, hereinafter carrier, urges that the hearing officer’s decision is supported by the evidence and should be affirmed.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision and order.
The facts of this case are set out in great detail in the hearing officer’s original decision, and will not be repeated at length here. Basically, the claimant was employed by (employer), doing sandblasting. The job required use of an air compressor, and it was testified to by claimant and other witnesses that persons using a compressor had to check the oil in the compressor on a daily basis. The claimant testified that on the morning of (date of injury), while he was attempting to check the oil, the compressor lid, which was made of sheet metal, fell and the folded-over lip of the lid struck him on the back of the head. The claimant said that he fell to his knees and had lost his sense of balance when he got up. He went to employer’s office, where he reported his injury to (Ms. B), the office manager. He said she told him he had a concussion, and she called one of employer’s owners, (Mr. CK) who took claimant to a clinic where he was examined by (Dr. M). Claimant said Dr. M told him he had “classic whiplash,” and he prescribed Vicodan. However, claimant wanted to see a chiropractor so the next day he began treatment with (Dr. G).
Portions of claimant’s testimony were disputed by several witnesses. Ms. B acknowledged that claimant came to her office, saying a compressor lid had hit him on the head, but she denied that she said he had a concussion. She said she looked at the back of his head and into his eyes and believed nothing was wrong with him; however, she told him to sit quietly until she could reach Mr. CK.
A coworker, (Mr. MB) testified that he learned of claimant’s injury right after it happened, when claimant passed by him, walking in a normal way, and said a lid had fallen on his head. He said that earlier in the day claimant had told him “he wished something would fall on his head or something would happen.” Mr. MB said the compressor lids had to be latched every time they were lifted, and that the latches were checked and found to be working properly after claimant reported his injury. Claimant testified, however, that on the compressor he was working with, one latch had always been broken and everyone was aware of that fact. He said he had hooked up the other latch, and was not certain whether it came undone, causing the lid to shut on his head. He denied that he told Mr. MB that he wished something would fall on his head, and said that he would not have said something like that to Mr. MB, who he did not like. Mr. MB and employer’s other owner, (Mr. FK), estimated that the compressor lids weighed 30-35 pounds, although claimant estimated the weight to be around 100 pounds.
Another coworker, (Mr. G), said that claimant had told him on (date) that he had been in a fight the night before at a family gathering. Claimant said at the hearing that Mr. G had been forced to lie to protect his job. Claimant gave a statement to carrier’s adjuster, however, that he had “gotten into a scuffle” the Friday before his injury, but said he had not been hurt.
The report of Dr. M noted x-rays had been taken, and diagnosed contusion-head/neck and neck pain/stiffness. It does not mention whiplash. Dr. M released the claimant to modified work the following day. Dr. G’s report of July 2nd said the claimant exhibited manifestations of an acute sprain/strain injury to the cervico-thoracic spine and the lumbo-sacral spine. Dr. G treated claimant with manipulation, electrical stimulation, and hot and cold pack therapy until the carrier refused to pay for further treatment. At the time of the hearing, the claimant said he had begun treating with another chiropractor, (Dr. S). No medical records from Dr. S were put into evidence.
At the hearing the claimant testified that he continues to have neck and back pain, as well as severe headaches. His mother testified that he told her about the injury the same day it occurred, and that she knows him to have physical problems from it. She said that she remembered claimant being involved in a scuffle in a bar, in which he was not hurt, but that that occurred a week or two before the family gathering on (date).
The claimant alleges error in the hearing officer’s finding that on (date of injury), the claimant may have sustained an injury to his neck on or before that date, but such injury did not occur while he was working for the employer on that date. He also alleges error in the conclusion of law stating that claimant did not sustain an injury in the course and scope of his employment on (date of injury). Claimant directs our attention to a Texas Supreme Court case, Scott v. Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Texas, 524 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1975), as standing for the proposition that if an employee is injured at work on the employer’s premises, at a time during which he normally works, sufficient evidence can sustain a jury finding of injury within the course and scope of employment. (Claimant also cites two other cases, Walters v. American States Insurance Company, 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1983) and Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Andrews, 110 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1937), which involved deceased employees; the employee in Walters had accompanied his supervisor to a meeting in a hotel and was later found murdered in a nearby field, and the employee in Andrews was killed when a steam boiler in a building close to her place of employment exploded.)
We find claimant’s reliance on these cases misplaced. As the hearing officer made clear, the key factor in this case was credibility, given the conflicting evidence; there was no question but that the activity by which claimant allegedly was injured was causally related to his conditions of employment. That being the case, the claimant’s burden was only to establish that his injuries were received while engaged in or about the furtherance of the employer’s affairs or business. In the instant case, the hearing officer held that the claimant had not met that burden. As the hearing officer noted in the discussion section of his decision, much of the evidence in this case was contradictory. The 1989 Act provides that the hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence offered and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165(a). As the finder of fact, he is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony and in the evidence. Burelsmith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 568 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ). While issues of injury and causation may be established by a claimant’s testimony alone, Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, N.J., 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ), the testimony of a claimant as an interested party only raises issues of fact for the hearing officer to determine. Escamilla v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 499 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). The hearing officer is entitled to reject a witness’ testimony where it is inconsistent or contradictory, or where the manner or demeanor of the witness created doubt concerning its truthfulness. Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ).
Our review of the record in this case convinces us that the hearing officer’s determination is supported by sufficient evidence and is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong or unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 751 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).
The decision of the hearing officer is affirmed.
Lynda H. Nesenholtz – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Stark O. Sanders, Jr. – Chief Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge