On April 7, 1992, a contested case hearing was held in (city), Texas, (hearing officer) presiding as hearing officer. He determined that the appellant did not suffer a compensable injury within the course and scope of his employment and was not entitled to benefits under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-1.01 et seq (Vernon Supp. 1992) (1989 Act). Appellant disagrees with the hearing officer’s decision and urges, in essence, that the evidence supports his entitlement to benefits.
DECISION
After a full review of the record, request for review, and the response, and finding the evidence sufficient to support the decision of the hearing officer, we affirm.
Succinctly, the appellant, who worked for (employer 1), on an intermittent basis for a couple of years, was part of a crew assigned to work at a (employer 2). He testified that shortly after arriving at the work site on (date of injury), he injured his neck, back, arms, legs and hand when he was coming down a three step stairway from a catwalk to the ground. He states that on the second step he twisted his ankle, turned 180 and fell on his back on the concrete area at the bottom of the stairs. Although there were two hand rails, he did not use them. He states he did not say anything but did shout out after he hit the ground. Two of appellant’s superiors, (Mr. J) and (Mr. W), were approximately three feet from where he fell Mr. W put out his hand and helped him up. He told Mr. W he needed to go to the doctor. He was subsequently driven to the hospital where he saw a (Dr. J). He subsequently saw a (Dr. MW). He claims he is disabled and has been unable to work since (date of injury). He was wearing a cervical collar at the hearing.
Mr. J appeared on behalf of the respondent, the employer’s carrier, and testified that when the crew reached the work site he told the appellant to wait in the truck while he talked to Mr. W. He does not know why the appellant got out of the truck and went on the catwalk. Mr. J said he was talking to Mr. W about three feet from where the appellant claims he fell. Although he observed the appellant on his back on the ground, he states that he did not hear any scuffling or see appellant fall, hear him shout, or otherwise make any noise. He opined that if appellant had actually fallen, he would have heard him fall since he was only three feet away.
Mr. W testified that he was talking to Mr. J about three feet from where the appellant says he fell. He did not see the appellant fall or hear any noise or hear the appellant shout out. When he noticed the appellant on the ground, he asked appellant what he was doing. The appellant said he had fallen and was hurt. Mr. W told him to stay there and he’d get some help, but appellant said “no, I can move,” and “I want to go to the doctor.” Mr. W stated he didn’t see any cuts or abrasions and opines that he would have known if the appellant had fallen down the steps.
(Mr. U) testified that the appellant started a fight with him on January 14, 1992. He stated the appellant came up to him and attempted to strike at least four blows. Mr. U said they scuffled and fought on the ground for several minutes as he, Mr. U tried to get away. He states the appellant was not wearing a cervical collar and did not appear to be injured or hurt.
Reports from two doctors who treated the appellant were admitted into evidence. Also, progress notes concerning treatment of appellant for a number of prior injuries, some of which included complaints of back injury, were admitted. Dr. J indicates in his medical report while noting an impression of cervical/lumbar strain, that he strongly suspects the appellant staged the fall and is malingering. A report from Dr. W, an orthopedic surgeon, who evaluated the appellant, states “[i]t is my impression that this patient is a malingerer without significant injury.”
With the evidence in this somewhat conflicting posture, the hearing officer determined that the appellant did not suffer a compensable injury within the course and scope of his employment with the employer on (date of injury). We find the evidence is sufficient to support the hearing officer’s determinations and decision.
A claimant has the burden of proving through a preponderance of the evidence, that an injury occurred within the course and scope of employment. Reed v. Aetna Casualty & Security Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e). The trier of fact is not required to accept a claimant’s testimony at face value even if not specifically contradicted by other evidence. Bullard v. Universal Underwriter’s Insurance Co., 609 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ). The hearing officer, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and the weight and credibility that it is to be given. Article 8308-6.34(e). He is charged with the responsibility and authority to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the facts of the case. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark, N.J., 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). The decision of the hearing officer is set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determinations is so weak or so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. In Re Kings Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1951); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92150 decided May 22, 1992. That is not the situation in this case. There is sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s determinations and decision.
The decision if affirmed.
Stark O. Sanders, Jr. – Chief Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge