This appeal arises under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act of 1989 (1989 Act). TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8308-1.01 through 11.10 (Vernon Supp. 1992). On March 24, 1992, a contested case hearing was held after continuances had been granted from hearings previously scheduled for November 21, 1991, and January 14, 1992. (Hearing officer) presided as hearing officer and found that claimant’s, appellant herein, heart attack of (date of injury), was not compensable. Appellant asserts that stress coupled with the physical exertion in driving a large truck may have prompted the immediate effects of the injury. He also says that the preponderance of medical evidence does show that work, rather than the natural progression of an existing heart condition, was a substantial contributing factor.
DECISION
Finding that the decision of the hearing officer is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we affirm.
Appellant is a truck driver for (employer) with almost 14 years of total service with the company. His employment had not been continuous and appellant testified that his attempts to gain employee benefits, such as longevity, to which he was entitled had caused stress which he labored under at the time of the heart attack on (date of injury). On (date of injury), appellant had departed (city) at approximately 12:30 a.m. driving an 18-wheel truck to (city). He reached (city), helped to unload the truck, and started back to (city). Near the city of (city) on the morning of (date of injury), he felt a burning in his chest and shortness of breath. He stopped there but was directed to (city), Texas, which had a hospital. He entered the emergency room and was admitted to intensive care in the (city) hospital. After three days there, appellant was told to see a heart specialist in (city). Appellant contacted (Dr. L) who found cardiac disease by coronary arteriography and then did balloon angioplasty to treat his two occluded vessels. After June 1, 1991, appellant went back to work.
Appellant testified that he had never had a heart attack before and did not have high blood pressure. He said that on the day in question it was not raining, the traffic was not heavy, and there was no specific event or emergency just before he felt chest pain. He did say that this truck’s front end tends to “wander” and the truck bounces causing him to have to “fight” the wheel which drains all the energy out of a person. He agreed that nothing unusual happened before he had the chest pain. He said he had no unusual stress outside the job and only alluded to the stress he felt in trying to secure his proper longevity with the employer.
Medical documents introduced at the hearing consisted of a single page letter from Dr. L offered by claimant and a single page form signed by both appellant and Dr. L offered by respondent. The form offered by respondent shows a “diagnosis and concurrent conditions contributing to this disability” as “coronary artery disease-2 vessel.” In answer to the question, “Is condition due to injury or sickness arising out of patient’s employment?” a box was checked “NO.” In answer to the instruction, “Describe accident . . .” Dr. L said “chest pain while driving.” The letter offered by appellant from Dr. L states that it is provided to clarify the form previously discussed. The relevant portion of that letter states in regard to whether the heart attack was related to employment:
That statement needs to be clarified in the sense that the immediate event was not caused by accident or injury; however, his evidence of acute myocardial injury happened while driving in (city) and resulted in his hospitalization in the first part of May. He had other features of coronary disease which were confirmed by coronary arteriographic study. This was subsequently adequately treated by balloon angioplasty technique.
While this is not the result of an accident or injury, as I interpreted the question of the insurance form to mean, there is always the question of whether or not job stress and physical stress may be an aggravating factor in the onset of the myocardial injury.
The hearing officer’s findings of fact reflect that he addressed the criteria found in Article 8308-4.15 of the 1989 Act. In Finding of Fact 8, he found that no specific event caused the attack. That finding is supported by testimony of the appellant himself and there is no other evidence that a specific event caused the attack. The hearing officer, in Finding of Fact 10, also found that Dr. L did not indicate that appellant’s work was a substantial contributing factor in the attack. Neither of Dr. L’s documents states that work was a substantial contributing factor. Additional medical data was not offered and no doctor testified at the hearing. (The strongest statement made by Dr. L says only that a question always exists as to whether job stress may be an aggravating factor. That statement does nothing to connect the heart attack to appellant’s work.) Since the hearing officer found no medical evidence that work was a substantial contributing factor, he did not have to address the next part of the equation that compares work to the natural progression of a preexisting heart condition or disease. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeals No. 91009 decided September 4, 1991; No. 91046 decided December 2, 1991; and No. 92115 decided May 4, 1992, regarding application of criteria under Article 8308-4.15 of the 1989 Act to heart attack cases. Finally, in Finding of Fact 12 the hearing officer found no mental or emotional stress immediately prior to the attack. While the appellant testified to some job related stress and general stress in driving a large truck, he did not identify stress as a triggering event and did not describe a sudden stimulus precipitating the stress. Each finding of the hearing officer that addressed statutory requirements was based on sufficient evidence of record and none was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
While the hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, in this case there was very little dispute as to the heart attack and the medical description and diagnosis of appellant’s condition. The hearing officer correctly applied the statutory criteria to the available facts (including medical facts) after having given appellant additional time to prepare for the hearing.
The decision is affirmed.
Joe Sebesta – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge