This appeal arises under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act of 1989 (1989 Act). TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1.01 through 11.10 (Vernon Supp. 1992). On May 20, 1992, a contested case hearing was held in (city), Texas, with (hearing officer) presiding. He found that claimant, appellant herein, did not slip and injure herself on (date of injury). Appellant states that “substantial” evidence would support a finding of compensable injury, that the hearing officer erroneously excluded certain medical evidence offered by appellant, that a mistake in a doctor’s report caused benefits to be denied, and that certain testimony of a witness for respondent was untrue.
DECISION
Finding that the decision is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we affirm.
Appellant worked for (employer) for about one year when she observed some clothes hangers on the floor at the work site. On (date of injury), she told an owner of the establishment, (BC) about the hangers and says also that she told BC she was not injured when she slipped on one and showed her a streak where she slipped on the concrete floor. Appellant’s testimony was that on (date of injury) she stepped on a hanger that was on the floor but did not fall; her left foot slid on the hanger and because she could not grab anything, she steadied herself by putting pressure on the left heel as she slid. She said she felt no pain then. She stated, “I’d say about maybe a week or so I started getting pains behind my left knee.” Later in her testimony, when answering the question, “[y]our pain started about one week after the (date), after (month) the (date)?” she said, “[a]bout a week or two.” She thought her problem might be in her shoes so she said nothing about her pain until January 12, 1992, when she told her supervisor, (HO), that she wished to rotate with another employee named Doris because she was in pain, but she did not say the pain was caused by a slip at work. On January 15, 1992, with (Ms. S) present, she told BC she was injured at work.
BC testified that appellant told her of hangers on the floor on (date of injury), and said she asked appellant if she slipped and injured herself. To which, she said that appellant replied, “[n]o (B). I just was afraid I might slip and I might hurt myself if I didn’t see the hangers.” She later stated appellant’s answer to be, “[n]o (B), I did not injure myself, I didn’t hurt myself, just afraid I might if I stepped on a hanger and didn’t see it.” BC added that appellant had been counseled for absences and lateness in November 1991, and was also warned her job could be at stake on January 6, 1992, for the same reasons. HO said in January 1992, appellant told him her feet hurt and he inquired as to the basis. He said appellant told him her heel hurt all the way up her leg. He added that she said she had foot problems before. He also asked her if it were “work comp”, and she said no. He added that the employee named (D) needed help and that appellant asked him if she could help (D) out, but did not say why. Appellant also introduced the statement of another employee, named (YY), who said that appellant had told her on the day the hangers were on the floor that she had almost slipped and never mentioned that again. She later told YY that she had blisters on her foot.
Appellant said she saw (Dr. W) for her problem on January 17, 1992. His report indicated that he saw appellant on January 16, 1992. He found a muscle strain in her leg and related appellant’s history of slipping on a coat hanger. He opines that since this happened on (date) and has been getting worse, he is pessimistic about her chance for recovery. He added, “[a]lso, the history is somewhat strange. It has now been two weeks or more since the time of injury, almost a month, and the patient only now comes in for her treatment. Furthermore, the history of the injury in terms or a slip with a twist to the right (sic) leg would be very unusual in terms of sustaining a permanent injury. There has been no history of the leg giving out on her or the knee locking up, which indicated to me that it is unlikely that there is a ligamentous rupture in the knee itself. This is all very hard to put together.” Appellant asserts that the mistake by Dr. W when he said “right” leg instead of “left” leg indicates that he may be mistaken also in some of his other comments. The mistake was brought to the attention of the hearing officer and was for him to evaluate as part of his evaluation of all the evidence. See Article 8308-6.34 (e) of the 1989 Act.
Appellant takes issue with the decision of the hearing officer not to admit three exhibits offered. One was the Initial Medical Report of (Dr. L), which referred to a visit of February 28, 1992. This related her history, the results of his examination, and referral of the appellant to physical therapy. (Dr. L) also took appellant off work. The other two documents offered were reports of physical therapy on appellant dated March 5th and March 25th, 1992. Respondent objected to admission based on delay of providing it with copies. Respondent had sent interrogatories to appellant’s attorney on April 16th and his return receipt shows they were received on April 20th. The interrogatories with copies of medical reports and other documents appellant intended to use were not mailed until May 12th and received by respondent on May 15th, with the hearing on May 20th. In attempting to show good cause why appellant did not meet the requirements of Tex W. C. Comm’n, 28 Tex. Admin. Code §142.13 (Rule 142.13), appellant testified that she was under a doctor’s care for three or four days in April with the flu. The sickness did not extend into May. Appellant came to her attorney’s office on May 12th to answer the interrogatories. The hearing officer sustained the objection to the introduction of the three documents based on failure to comply with Rule 142.13. He found that good cause was not shown for the delay.
The hearing officer did not abuse his discretion in refusing to admit documents. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 91076 (Docket No. redacted) decided December 31, 1991. His decision that good cause was not shown in failing to provide copies of documents until five days before hearing based on four days of sickness between April 20th and May 12th was not arbitrary. A decision on a question of good cause will not be found to be arbitrary when it considers relevant factors and reaches a reasonable result. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 91117 (Docket No. redacted) decided February 3, 1992. Even if the documents should have been admitted, they would only have reiterated appellant’s recitation of her history of the injury, and other evidence through appellant and Dr. W already showed appellant’s view of her history. At most, failure to admit would not be a reversible error. See Hernandez v. Hernandez, 611 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Article 8308-6.43 (e) of the 1989 Act. As trier of fact he considers conflicting evidence whether between two witnesses or within one witness’ own testimony. Ashcraft v. United Supermarkets Inc., 758 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied). He may believe part, but not all, of a witness’ testimony. Bullard v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 609 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ). Even though appellant attacks BC’s testimony, the hearing officer could believe BC when she said that appellant denied even slipping, much less that she injured herself. The 1989 Act does not provide benefits for an incident unless injury arises from it. The finding of the hearing officer that appellant did not slip and injure herself is based on sufficient evidence of record. This finding supports the conclusion that no injury occurred in the course and scope of employment. Finally, appellant attaches a document that was not offered in evidence. It will not be considered. Article 8308-6.42 (a) of the 1989 Act states that the appeals panel will consider the record, the appeal, and the response in reaching its decision.
Finding that the decision is supported by sufficient evidence of record, we affirm. See Maryland Gas Co. v. Duke, 825 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ his’y).
Joe Sebesta – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Stark O. Sanders, Jr. – Chief Appeals Judge
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge