This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on November 29, 1999. The issues at the CCH were injury, date of injury, timely report of injury, election of remedies and disability. The hearing officer concluded that the appellant (claimant herein) did not suffer a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease; that the date of the alleged injury was ________; that the claimant timely reported an injury; that the claimant did not make an election of remedies; and that the claimant did not have disability. The claimant appeals the hearing officer’s resolution of the injury and disability issues contending the evidence established she suffered a compensable injury and sustained disability. The respondent (carrier herein) replies that the decision of the hearing officer was sufficiently supported by the evidence.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The claimant testified that she had worked for the employer since 1997 as a customer service representative. The claimant also testified that her duties included working on a 10-key machine, data entry, typing, and lifting boxes. The claimant stated that in January 1999 her left elbow started swelling. In February 1999 the claimant began treating for these problems with Dr. M. Dr. M eventually diagnosed the claimant with bilateral epicondylitis which he related to her work. Dr. M stated as follows in a July 12, 1999, letter:
There [sic] obviously confusion and concern over whether [the claimant’s] bilateral epicondylitis is work-related or not. The answer to this question is YES, her elbow pain is definitely related to her work duties. The greatest evidence for this comes from the positive progress she has made since not working over the last month. [The claimant] cannot recollect any activity outside of work that could have started or perpetuated her pain. She can, however, relate a number of work-related physical activities which have played significant roles in starting and aggravating her pain.
It was undisputed that the claimant did not work from May 17, 1999, to July 21, 1999, because of physical problems. There was evidence in the record concerning an ongoing conflict between the claimant and her supervisor concerning her job performance beginning in January 1999.
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
A finding of injury may be based upon the testimony of the claimant alone. Houston Independent School District v. Harrison, 744 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). However, as an interested party, the claimant’s testimony only raises an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Escamilla v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 499 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). In the present case, the hearing officer found no injury contrary to the testimony of the claimant as well as medical evidence. Claimant had the burden to prove she was injured in the course and scope of her employment. Reed v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We cannot say that the hearing officer was incorrect as a matter of law in finding that the claimant failed to meet this burden. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Finally, with no compensable injury found, there is no loss upon which to find disability. By definition, disability depends upon a compensable injury. See Section 401.011(16).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Tommy W. Lueders – Appeals Judge