This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on March 8, 2000. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) failed to establish that his neck problems and current right elbow symptoms are causally related to his compensable injury of __________. Based upon these determinations, the hearing officer did not find that the claimant had disability from September 14, 1999, through the date of the CCH as result of his compensable injury. The claimant appeals, arguing that the evidence established that his current neck and right elbow problems are a result of his __________, injury, and caused disability from September 14, 1999, continuing through the date of the CCH. The respondent (carrier) replies that the decision of the hearing officer is sufficiently supported by the evidence.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to his right elbow on __________. The claimant testified that this injury took place while he was working as a registered nurse and lifted a heavy bag of linen to put in a cart, twisting his arm the wrong way. The claimant was treated in the emergency room (ER) for pain to his right elbow. The claimant continued treatment of his elbow for some time. In July 1999 the claimant went to an ER complaining of neck and head pain. The claimant was eventually diagnosed with a cervical herniated disc. Dr. S, a neurosurgeon, stated as follows in a letter dated November 22, 1999:
I have evaluated [the claimant] in my office for symptoms of cervical radiculopathy related to an on-the-job injury in 1997. [The claimant] states that he had symptoms in his right arm after the injury, which were apparently initially thought to be related to an elbow problem. However, in retrospect they probably were cervical radicular in nature. This would relate his cervical condition to his work injury in my opinion.
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. This is also true of the extent of an injury. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
A finding of injury may be based upon the testimony of the claimant alone. Houston Independent School District v. Harrison, 744 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). However, as an interested party, the claimant’s testimony only raises an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Escamilla v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 499 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). In the present case, the hearing officer found no causal relationship between the claimant’s injury and his neck and right elbow problems. We cannot say that the hearing officer was incorrect as a matter of law in reaching these conclusions. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Disability is a question of fact to be determined by the hearing officer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93560, decided August 19, 1993. Disability can be established by a claimant’s testimony alone, even if contradictory of medical testimony. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92285, decided August 14, 1992; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92167, decided June 11, 1992. Applying the standard of review discussed above, we find no basis to reverse the hearing officer’s finding regarding disability.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge