This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on April 4, 2000. With regard to the issues before her, the hearing officer determined that the respondent’s (claimant) compensable injury of __________ (all dates are 1999 unless otherwise noted), is a producing cause of his current left knee condition; and that claimant had disability beginning on January 18, 2000, and continuing through March 13, 2000. The appellant (carrier) appealed, contending that there is no causal connection between claimant’s ________ compensable injury and his current condition (a torn medial meniscus) or, in the alternative, there was an intervening sole cause injury. Carrier requests that we reverse the hearing officer’s decision and render a decision in its favor. The appeal file contains no response from the claimant.
DECISION
Affirmed.
Claimant had been employed as a laborer by (employer) doing heavy construction. It is undisputed that on __________ claimant fell off a forklift, injuring his right thigh and left knee. The parties stipulated that claimant sustained a compensable injury on that date. It is also undisputed that claimant continued to work his regular shift until June 14th. Claimant testified that his knee had gotten progressively worse and that he saw Dr. S on June 14th. Dr. S placed claimant on light duty and the employer accommodated claimant with light duty at full pay until June 21st when claimant was released to full duty. Claimant continued to work regular duty with the employer until July 1st when claimant went to work for (Company S) driving a water transport truck. Claimant testified that he continued to have “deep” knee pain throughout and that his knee injury never resolved. It is undisputed that over the Labor Day weekend claimant was recruited to play in a one-day softball tournament because “he was a pretty good player and we were short.” Witnesses did not notice claimant limping or grimacing while playing softball. Claimant continued to work for Company S until January 2000. At that point, claimant said that his knee took a turn for the worse and Company S moved claimant’s job to another town 38 miles away. Claimant returned to Dr. S on January 18, 2000, complaining of left knee pain and Dr. S took claimant off work. Claimant continued to be off work until March 13, 2000, when the employer offered claimant a modified-duty position at claimant’s preinjury wage, which claimant accepted. Dr. S referred claimant to a specialist, Dr. B, who ordered an MRI. The MRI was performed on March 27, 2000, and revealed a “medial meniscus tear involving the posterior horn.”
Dr. S’s Initial Medical Report (TWCC-61) of the initial June 14th visit showed left knee “swelling & pain” and “slight effusion palpable.” The diagnosis was left knee effusion. X-rays were negative. The report of January 18, 2000, just showed left knee pain on a “limited exam.” A brief note dated February 3, 2000, noted the history and a referral for an orthopedic follow-up evaluation. Nothing other than the MRI is available from Dr. B.
The hearing officer, in her Statement of the Evidence, comments:
The preponderance of the evidence shows that Claimant’s __________ injury was a producing cause of his current left knee condition, specifically, his torn medial meniscus. The testimony and evidence regarding Claimant’s mechanism of injury, symptoms and continued “deep” pain is consistent with this previously undiagnosed injury. There is insufficient evidence to show, as Carrier asserted, that an intervening injury was the sole cause of this condition.
Carrier’s appeal emphasizes the following: that Dr. S on June 18th says claimant is “doing much better,” that claimant returned to full duty with the employer from June 21st to July 1st, claimant’s truck driving with Company S, and that operating the clutch would aggravate claimant’s knee and claimant’s performance in the softball game. Carrier argues that those facts (and others not recited) show that there was no causal connection between the torn meniscus and that claimant’s work with Company S “is the sole cause of his torn medial meniscus (by virtue of a six-month repetitive trauma injury).
Those were all facts to be considered by the hearing officer. While the burden is on the claimant to prove that the compensable __________ injury was a producing cause of the torn meniscus, the hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165. The hearing officer resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the medical evidence and judges the weight to be given to expert medical testimony. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). To this end, the hearing officer as fact finder may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. The testimony of a claimant as an interested party raises only an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision, we will reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Injury may be proven by the testimony of the claimant alone and objective medical evidence is not required to establish that particular conduct resulted in the claimed injury, except in those cases where the subject is so technical in nature that a fact finder lacks the liability from common knowledge to find a causal basis. Carrier argues that the hearing officer “did not make a specific finding on the sole cause issue” that had been raised by the carrier. We do not disagree with the contention that the hearing officer made no specific findings on sole cause but point out the hearing officer specifically rejected carrier’s contention as indicated by the above-quoted comment. The fact that another fact finder could have drawn different inferences from the evidence of the record, which would have supported a different result, does not provide a basis for us to reverse the hearing officer’s decision on appeal. Salazar, et al. v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Upon review of the record submitted, we find no reversible error and we will not disturb the hearing officer’s determinations unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. In re King=s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). We do not so find and, consequently, the decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Alan C. Ernst – Appeals Judge