This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on May 23, 2000. The hearing officer determined that the compensable injury of _________, does not extend to the appellant’s (claimant) bilateral upper extremities; and that the claimant’s current problems with her cervical and lumbar spine are the result of the _________, compensable injury. The claimant appeals, arguing that she complained of upper extremity problems from the beginning and that her diagnosis of upper extremity problems was delayed because initial testing was not performed. The respondent (carrier) replies that the initial diagnosis was lumbar and cervical strains and that there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer. There was no appeal of the hearing officer’s finding that the claimant’s current cervical and lumbar problems are related to her compensable injury and this finding has become final pursuant to Section 410.169.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
It was undisputed that the claimant suffered a compensable injury on _________. The claimant described her injury as taking place at work while unloading a box of invoices and reels of tape from a pick-up truck and throwing them into a dumpster. The claimant testified that when doing this she felt pain from the neck down to the bottom of her feet. The claimant was initially diagnosed with lumbar and cervical strain. Subsequently, in April 1999, the claimant was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) and cubital tunnel syndrome. There is conflicting medical evidence concerning whether the claimant’s CTS and cubital tunnel syndrome are related to her compensable injury, with Dr. J expressing an opinion that they are not based upon his review of the claimant’s medical records.
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. This is also true of the extent of an injury. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
A finding of injury may be based upon the testimony of the claimant alone. Houston Independent School District v. Harrison, 744 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). However, as an interested party, the claimant’s testimony only raises an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Escamilla v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 499 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). In the present case, the hearing officer found that the claimant’s compensable injury did not extend to or include an injury to her upper extremities. The claimant had the burden to prove her injury. Reed v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We cannot say that the hearing officer was incorrect as a matter of law in finding that the claimant failed to meet this burden in regard to proving an injury to her upper extremities. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Section Manager/Judge