This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on June 6, 2000. The hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant herein) sustained a compensable injury to his left knee and that the claimant had disability from February 11, 2000, continuing through the date of the CCH. The appellant (self-insured herein) appeals contending that the hearing officer findings of injury and disability were not sufficiently supported by the evidence. There is no response from the claimant in the appeal file.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The claimant testified that he suffered an injury on __________, while he was cutting tree limbs. The claimant stated that while doing so one limb fell striking him in the back and causing him to stumble and fall to his left knee. The claimant testified that as result he suffered an injury to his back and left knee. Medical tests did not show an injury to the claimant’s back but did show a partial tear in the medial meniscus of the claimant’s left knee. The claimant testified that he had not worked since __________. He testified that he contacted the employer when his doctor released him to medium duty but was told he could not work with this restriction. The claimant testified that he sought other employment but had not obtained other employment.
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Generally corroboration of an injury is not required and may be found based upon a claimant’s testimony alone. Houston Independent School District v. Harrison, 744 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
Applying this standard, we find sufficient evidence in the claimant’s testimony to support the hearing officer’s finding of injury. The self-insured points to conflicting testimony from other witnesses, but it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these conflicts. The self-insured primarily argues that the way the claimant describes the accident was a physical impossibility because the claimant, who testified he was standing on the ground, could not have reached a tree limb in the telephone wires. The problem with the self-insured’s argument is that it presupposes that the limb could not extend from a level the claimant could reach from the ground up to the level of the wires or that the wires themselves were not extending downward toward a connection with a house. Either of course is possible which means the self-insured has not established the claimant’s injury was a physical impossibility. In any case, the hearing officer found the evidence sufficient to support an injury and we do not find the overwhelming evidence to be contrary to this finding.
Disability is a question of fact to be determined by the hearing officer and may be based on the testimony of the claimant alone. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93560, decided August 19, 1993. The claimant testified that he had disability beginning on February 11, 2000, and continuing through the date of the CCH. The claimant testified that although he was released back to medium work, the employer would not take him back with this restriction. The self-insured argues that there was conflicting evidence concerning disability and even conflicting testimony in the claimant’s testimony concerning disability. It was the province of the hearing officer to resolve any conflicts in the evidence and we find sufficient evidence to support his finding of disability.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Tommy W. Lueders – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge