Title: 

APD 002017

Significant Decision

Date: 

October 10, 2000

Issues: 

Disabilty/Existence-Duration, Existence of Compensable Inj, Timely Reporting to Employer

Table of Contents

APD 002017

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on August 1, 2000. The issues at the CCH were whether the respondent (claimant) had sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury, whether the claimant had reported the injury to her employer within 30 days of the date of the injury, and whether the claimant had disability resulting from the alleged injury. The hearing officer resolved all issues in favor of the claimant. The appellant (self-insured) contends that the hearing officer’s determinations were against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and requests that we reverse the hearing officer and render a new decision that the claimant did not sustain an injury, did not report a work-related injury within 30 days, and did not have disability. The claimant replies that the hearing officer’s determinations were supported by the evidence and should be affirmed.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The claimant worked as a cashier for the self-insured and had experienced low back pain in __________. She was off work for several weeks until the low back pain resolved. She returned to work and had several instances of low back pain which were relieved with what appear to have been epidural steroid injections. On __________, the claimant again began to experience some low back pain at work, but at approximately 3:00 a.m. on October 19, 1999, she woke in extreme pain and was taken to the hospital by ambulance. The claimant testified that she was off the day she was taken to the hospital, but was scheduled to work on __________. She called and talked to Ms. S, one of her supervisors, telling her that she would be unable to come to work because she had hurt her back picking up something the last time she had worked.

On October 22, 1999, the claimant sought medical attention from Dr. I. Dr. I took her off work and she has not returned to work since then. On October 22, 1999, the claimant and her husband went to the self-insured and her husband took the off-work slip from Dr. I in and gave it to Ms. D, another supervisor. The claimant testified that her husband told Ms. D that she had been injured at work. Several days later, the claimant talked to Ms. T, a manager with the self-insured. The claimant testified that she told Ms. T that she was unable to work because she had hurt her back while lifting.

Ms. T and Ms. S both testified. Neither recalled the claimant telling them that she had been injured at work. Ms. T also testified that she was not advised that the claimant had been injured at work by Ms. D. Ms. T testified that she was under the impression that the claimant’s back injury was not work related and that had she believed that the injury was work related she would not have suggested that the claimant come in to get paperwork to file for disability benefits.

The claimant testified that the pain beginning on __________ is much more severe and longer in duration than the pain she had experienced in __________ and on occasion since then. The claimant was examined by Dr. R. Dr. R stated in his report:

I have been asked whether repetitive trauma could have caused the damage seen on the MRI. The answer is, no. The damage on the MRI pre-existed the patient’s injury, this by at least several years. However, the attested to injury mechanism certainly could have given her low back pain. I do believe that the patient’s claims are related to her work.

At the present time, I do not believe that the patient is capable of return [sic] to work.

It is clear in this case that there is conflict in the witnesses’ testimony and some conflict in the history given to Dr. R, a history which is normally relied upon by health care professionals. The hearing officer is charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses and other evidence before him and assigning the weight to be given to the evidence. In discharging that responsibility in this case, he resolved the inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the claimant.

The hearing officer is the trier of fact and is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of the weight and credibility to be given to the evidence. Section 410.165(a). While a claimant’s testimony alone may be sufficient to prove an injury, the testimony of a claimant is not conclusive but only raises a factual issue for the trier of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 91065, decided December 16, 1991. The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93426, decided July 5, 1993. This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). In a case such as the one before us where both parties presented evidence on the disputed issues, the hearing officer must look at all of the relevant evidence to make factual determinations and the Appeals Panel must consider all of the relevant evidence to determine whether the factual determinations of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 941291, decided November 8, 1994. An appeals level body is not a fact finder, and it does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgement for that of the trier of fact even if the evidence could support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). Only were we to conclude, which we do not in this case, that the hearing officer’s determinations were so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust would there be a sound basis to disturb those determinations. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 224 S.W.2d 660 (1951); Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Since we find the evidence sufficient to support the determinations of the hearing officer, we will not substitute our judgement for his. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94044, decided February 17, 1994.

Finding no reversible error in the record and sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s decision, we affirm the hearing officer’s Decision and Order.

Kenneth A. Huchton – Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge

Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge