This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on September 6, 2000. The issues at the CCH were whether the appellant’s (claimant) compensable injury to his cervical spine aggravated his preexisting cervical disease resulting in surgery, and whether he had disability resulting from his compensable injury of __________.
The hearing officer held that the claimant did not aggravate his cervical condition when he hit his head on __________, and that his preexisting condition was the reason for his surgery. The hearing officer found no compensable disability.
The claimant appealed and argued that the decision is against the great weight of the credible evidence. The respondent (carrier) responds that the decision is supported by the record.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The CCH was short. The claimant was employed to inspect aircraft being built by (employer) when he came up under an aircraft and banged his head while entering a chamber there. He contended that he lost consciousness. This happened on __________. The claimant said he lost only a very few days of work (four or five days) and then was only off work for various doctor’s appointments thereafter. The claimant retired from service with the employer in 1997 and had not worked since that time.
On April 30, 1999, after some testing on his neck, the claimant had cervical fusion surgery. He had a follow-up surgery in September 1999. Asked about whether he had a diagnosis of neck problems prior to 1993, the claimant said no, but then also agreed he had been treated by his family doctor, Dr. T, for neck pain prior to this time. The claimant said that in 1996, he fell on his shoulder at work. The claimant also had carpal tunnel release surgery in 1995 or 1996.
Medical records in evidence reflect that Dr. T treated cervical syndrome, cervical arthritis, or cervical degenerative joint disease on March 3, 1993; June 11, 1993 (report notes his occupation); September 21, 1993; December 29, 1993 (records note injury on the job); January 16, 1995; February 27, 1995; August 11, 1995; October 30, 1995; January 29, 1996; March 13,1997; December 22, 1998; and April 14, 1999. Dr. T wrote a letter on January 3, 1994, which said that the claimant had been treated for neck pain since June 1993, and had not mentioned at his September 21, 1993, visit (a regular follow-up visit) that he may have struck his head on a tool.
On September 21, 1993, the claimant was referred for an x-ray which found a loss of normal cervical lordosis and associated secondary degenerative changes at C5-6 and C6-7. The claimant was referred for a bone density test in February 1996 which found that the claimant had a mild fracture risk in his lumbar area but no significant risk for the cervical area. A cervical MRI done on January 25, 1999, reported extensive osteophytes and ridging at various cervical levels. A report from Dr. C dated February 24, 1999, states a history of 10 years of neck pain during prolonged periods of neck flexion. A lumbar MRI of May 26, 2000, showed various degenerative changes.
Clinic notes from the employer’s clinic stated that the claimant reported hitting his head on a jig on June 13, 1995. There was a resulting wound on his scalp. These same notes show that he fell to the floor injuring his left shoulder on December 5, 1995. It appears that the claimant first reported the September 17 injury to the clinic on September 22, 1993. An earlier note comments that the claimant had left shoulder surgery on May 26, 1992.
The claimant was examined on February 8, 1995, by Dr. V on referral from Dr. T. He noted a history of neck problems from the date the claimant hit his head two years earlier. Dr. V diagnosed cervical syndrome without radicular findings and marked degeneration at two cervical levels.
We note that there are no medical opinions attributing the condition resulting in the claimant’s cervical surgery back to the 1993 injury. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza. This is equally true of medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The record suggests a number of causes other than the 1993 accident for the condition leading to surgery. The hearing officer could conclude from this record that the bump on the head resulted in no neck injury or aggravation and was comparatively minor.
An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.- Beaumont 1993, no writ). The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We do not agree that this was the case here, and affirm the decision and order.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Kenneth A. Huchton – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge