Following a contested case hearing held on August 15, 2000, pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act), the hearing officer, resolved the disputed issues by determining that the appellant (claimant herein) did not sustain a compensable injury on __________, and, therefore, did not have disability. The claimant appeals, arguing that the hearing officer’s decision was contrary to the evidence and was the result of bias. The respondent (carrier herein) argues that the hearing officer’s decision is sufficiently supported by the evidence.
DECISION
Applying our standard of review, we affirm the decision of the hearing officer.
The hearing officer details his view of the evidence in his decision. The essential facts of the case are that the claimant testified that on __________, she slipped and fell at work, injuring her right ankle, left hip, and lower back. The claimant’s assertion of injury is supported by medical evidence.
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
A finding of injury may be based upon the testimony of the claimant alone. Houston Independent School District v. Harrison, 744 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). However, as an interested party, the claimant’s testimony only raises an issue of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Escamilla v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 499 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). In the present case, the hearing officer found no injury contrary to the testimony of the claimant and medical evidence. The hearing officer states in his decision that he was not persuaded by medical evidence because the doctors relied upon history given to them by the claimant. The claimant had the burden to prove she was injured in the course and scope of her employment. Reed v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We cannot say that the hearing officer was incorrect as a matter of law in finding that the claimant failed to meet this burden. This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We have also, on numerous occasions, held that the Appeals Panel should not set aside the decision of a hearing officer because the hearing officer may have drawn inferences and conclusions different than those the Appeals Panel deems most reasonable, even though the record contains evidence of inconsistent inferences. Garza, supra; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93334, decided June 14, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93053, decided March 1, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92539, decided November 25, 1992.
The claimant contends that the hearing officer’s decision was motivated by bias against claimants in general and the claimant’s attorney in particular. The claimant argues that this bias is shown by past rulings of this hearing officer as well as the fact that in the present case, while the thrust of the carrier’s case was that the injury was not compensable because it was an idiopathic fall, the hearing officer decided to determine that the injury was staged without any evidence that this was the case. We will not infer bias absent evidence of bias. It was the province of the hearing officer to weigh the evidence and decide the facts of the case. Applying our standard of review, we find no basis for reversal. This does not mean that we necessarily find that the hearing officer’s interpretation of the evidence to be the most reasonable interpretation of the evidence.
Finally, with no compensable injury found, there is no loss upon which to find disability. By definition, disability depends upon a compensable injury. See Section 401.011(16).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge