This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 31, 2000. With regard to the issues before him, the hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) had not sustained a compensable (neck and low back) injury on __________ (all dates are 2000 unless otherwise noted), and that the claimant did not have disability.
The claimant appealed, asserting that the decision was not supported by the evidence and stating that the “case rest[s] on the medical report…..nd in the testimony of claimant.” The claimant requests that we reverse the hearing officer’s decision and render a decision in her favor. The respondent (carrier) responds to the points raised by the claimant and urges affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant was employed as a bus driver. She testified that on May 12, during the morning shift (of a split shift), she was making a very sharp left turn onto a narrow street (“a very tight corner”) when she “felt the sharp pull in [her] back.” The claimant said that she finished her route, then went home, took some pain medication, and took a nap. She said that when she woke up, she was in severe pain and called the employer and reported her injury. The claimant went in the following day, May 13, and completed an injury report. She sought medical care with Dr. S, a chiropractor, on Monday, May 15. After two treatments, the claimant saw her family doctor, Dr. T and subsequently began treating with Dr. C.
Dr. S’s report of the May 15 visit has diagnostic codes for various aspects of a low back sprain/strain. Dr. S took the claimant off work until May 19. Dr. T, on an Initial Medical Report (TWCC-61) of a May 17 visit also used diagnostic codes of low back and thoracic spine sprain/strain and took the claimant off work until June 5. Dr. C apparently began treating the claimant on May 25 and, in a report of that date, noted neck complaints, in addition to low back pain. Dr. C began treating the claimant three times a week with conservative treatment and diagnosed cervical and lumbar strains/sprains. All three doctors recited a history consistent with the claimant’s testimony of turning the steering wheel. Dr. C, in response to a letter from the claimant’s attorney, marked “yes” that in reasonable medical probability the claimant sustained injuries to her lumbar and cervical areas on May 12 and that the “accident cause[d] structural damage to [the claimant’s] back and neck.” As the carrier points out, nowhere do the doctors explain how turning a steering wheel caused a lumbar and cervical strain/sprain.
The carrier, on cross-examination, presented evidence that the claimant had some absentee problems and in dispute is whether the claimant had missed work the day before the alleged injury which may have led to suspension or termination.
Rather clearly, the hearing officer did not find the claimant credible and was not persuaded by medical reports which were based largely on the history the claimant gave the doctor. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a). As the finder of fact, the hearing officer resolves conflicts in the evidence and may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950084, decided February 28, 1995. A fact finder is not bound by the testimony (or evidence) of a medical witness where the credibility of that testimony (or evidence) is manifestly dependent upon the credibility of the information imparted to the medical witness by the claimant. Rowland v. Standard Fire Insurance Company, 489 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.). An appellate-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. Appeal No. 950084, supra. When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we should set aside the decision of the hearing officer only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Appeal No. 950084. We conclude that the hearing officer’s decision is supported by sufficient evidence and that it is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge