United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

JAASIN TAYLOR, Plaintiff,

v.

BALL CORPORATION, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-CV-03173

|

Filed 02/02/2024

ORDER

The Honorable Alfred H. Bennett United States District Judge

*1 Before the Court are two motions: Defendant Ball Corporation’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #20), Plaintiff Jaasin Taylor’s Response (Doc. #22), and Defendant’s Reply (Doc. #23); and Defendant’s Motion to Exclude (Doc. #19), Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. #21), and Defendant’s Reply (Doc. #24). Having considered the parties’ arguments and the applicable legal authorities, the Court grants Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #20) and denies Defendant’s Motion to Exclude (Doc. #19) as moot.

Plaintiff was an employee of Manpower Group US, Inc. (“Manpower”), an employment service that temporarily assigned its employees to other companies. See Doc. #20 at 6; Doc. #22 at 5. In April 2014, Manpower entered an agreement for temporary staffing services with Defendant. Doc. #20 at 6; Doc. #22, Ex, 1 at 22–29. On February 23, 2021, Manpower obtained liability insurance, including worker’s compensation insurance, from Aon Risk Services Central, Inc. Doc. #20, Ex. 3 at 3. On the certificate of Manpower’s liability insurance, it lists Defendant as an additional insured and a holder of the certificate. Id.

Plaintiff was temporarily assigned by Manpower to work at Defendant’s facility in Conroe, Texas. Doc. #22 at 6. On July 25, 2021, while at the Conroe facility, Plaintiff claims that he lost his footing and fell to the ground, which caused him to land in a hot fluid that had leaked from one of the machines. Id. at 7–8. He was transported to the emergency room to receive treatment for his injuries. Id. at 8. After the incident, Plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim with Manpower for his injuries and received such benefits. Doc. #20 at 7.

On August 18, 2021, Plaintiff sued Defendant in the 284th Judicial District Court of Montgomery County, asserting negligence and gross negligence claims. Doc. #1, Ex. 1. Defendant subsequently removed the case to this Court on September 29, 2021. Doc. #1. Now, Defendant asserts in its Motion for Summary Judgment that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (the “TWCA”). Doc. #20 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 93.004(a)–(b), 408.001).

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that it “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005). “Once the movant does so, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish an issue of fact that warrants trial. All reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.” Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2020). Self-serving affidavits and declarations are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact so long as the statements are “made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 161 (5th Cir. 2021).

*2 Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s negligence and gross negligence claims against it are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the TWCA because Plaintiff sought and received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. Doc. #20. Plaintiff avers that Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment because Defendant did not show that Plaintiff was one of its employees. Doc. #22. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is required to show that he was a “borrowed servant” of Defendant’s or that Defendant had the right to control the details and means of his work to be entitled to summary judgment. Id. But for the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s arguments fail as a matter of law.

The TWCA provides that “[r]ecovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage … for … a work-related injury sustained by the employee.” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a). The TWCA further states that “if a temporary employment service elects to obtain workers’ compensation insurance, the client of the temporary employment service and the temporary employment service are subject to … Section 408.001.” Id. § 93.004(b). To be entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the TWCA, Defendant must establish that “(1) it was the client company of a temporary employment service; (2) the temporary employment service carried workers’ compensation insurance; and (3) that Plaintiff was an employee covered by that workers’ compensation insurance coverage.” Martinez v. Valassis Sales & Mktg. Servs., Inc., No. H-20-178, 2020 WL 7010045, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2020) (citing Robles v. Mount Franklin Food, L.L.C., 591 S.W.3d 158, 166 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019)).

It is undisputed that Manpower is a temporary employment service and Defendant was one of its clients at the time Plaintiff was injured. Doc. #22 at 5; Doc. #20 at 6; Doc. #22, Ex, 1 at 22–29. Further, it is undisputed that Manpower carried workers’ compensation insurance. Doc. #20, Ex. 3 at 3. In fact, Plaintiff argues that the fact that Manpower had workers’ compensation insurance is not dispositive, thereby conceding that Manpower had such insurance. See Doc. #22 at 21. Finally, Plaintiff was covered by Manpower’s workers’ compensation insurance. James Stewart, Manpower’s Risk Manager who handled Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim, stated in a sworn declaration that Plaintiff was covered by Manpower’s workers’ compensation insurance at the time he was injured and that Plaintiff “has received workers’ compensation benefits” from Manpower’s policy. Doc. #20, Ex. 3 at 2. Plaintiff does not present any evidence or arguments to the contrary.

As such, based on the uncontested facts in the summary judgment record, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #20) is hereby GRANTED. Further, because Plaintiffs claims are barred, Defendant’s Motion to Exclude (Doc. #19) is DENIED AS MOOT. A final judgment will be entered by separate order.

It is so ORDERED.