This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on December 5, 1997, with hearing officer. With regard to the issues at the CCH, she (hearing officer) determined that the appellant’s (claimant) ________, compensable lumbar and bilateral knee injury does not extend to his thoracic and cervical spine. The claimant appeals, seeks a reversal of the decision and argues it is against the great weight of the evidence. The respondent (carrier) responds and seeks an affirmance of the decision.
DECISION
We affirm.
The hearing officer fairly summarizes the facts in the decision and we adopt his rendition of the facts. We discuss only those facts necessary to our decision. The parties stipulated that on ________, the claimant sustained a compensable lumbar and bilateral knee injury. He testified at the CCH that the injury occurred when he was pinned between two delivery trucks while working for (employer). He said he fell onto his tailbone and his left side, against the truck’s rear door.
A ________, emergency room report noted lacerations on his knees. On ______ , the employer-selected doctor, (Dr. TR), diagnosed bilateral lower leg open wounds and crushing injuries. Dr. TR ordered x-rays of the claimant’s legs, which were negative. His chiropractor, (Dr. E), released him from work on June 7, 1996, and referred him to a neurologist, (Dr. K). A July 2, 1996, radiographic test revealed degenerative disc narrowing of the T11-T12 level of the thoracic area. On July 12, 1996, Dr. K stated that a “[h]ead and neck exam is a traumatic [sic] and normocephalic [sic].” On July 26, 1996, a carrier-selected required medical examination (RME) doctor, (Dr. B), noted a history of tailbone and bilateral leg injuries and certified that he had not reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). On November 5, 1996, an orthopedic surgeon, (Dr. M), diagnosed a thoracolumbar strain. On January 7, 1997, Dr. B certified that he reached MMI with an eight percent impairment rating (IR). On April 7, 1997, another chiropractor, (Dr. TA), observed bilateral leg and low-back injuries and certified that he reached MMI, with a 13% IR. On May 8, 1997, the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission)-appointed designated doctor, (Dr. D), certified that he reached MMI, with an eight percent IR, and noted a cervical radiculopathy unrelated to the compensable injury. On August 15, 1997, another carrier-selected RME doctor, (Dr. G), opined she did not possess enough information to determine whether the claimant’s thoracic and cervical complaints were related to his compensable injury.
The issue of the extent of an injury is a fact question for the hearing officer. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92653, decided January 21, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92654, decided January 22, 1993. The contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. Section 410.165(a). It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing officer when the determination is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950456, decided May 9, 1995. Although the medical evidence is conflicting, we conclude that the determination regarding the extent of the claimant’s injury is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust.
The resolution of an extent of injury issue cannot predetermine the resolution of a medical benefit issue. The determination of “benefit disputes,” those “regarding compensability or eligibility for, or the amount of, income or death benefits,” are adjudicated by the Commission’s Hearings Division. Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 140.1 (Rule 140.1). The determination of what “health care is reasonably required by the nature of the injury” is adjudicated by the Commission’s Medical Review Division. Sections 408.021(a) and 413.031(a); Rule 133.305; see also Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 971653, decided October 2, 1997; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 951258, decided September 13, 1995. Our decision neither affects the claimant’s right to lifetime medical benefits nor any party’s rights to medical dispute resolution by the Medical Review Division. Section 408.021(a); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92649, decided January 6, 1993; see also Section 413.031; Rule 133.305; and TEX. GOV. CODE ANN. § 2001 et seq.
The decision is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and, therefore, we affirm.
Christopher L. Rhodes – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Alan C. Ernst – Appeals Judge
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge