This appeal is brought pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on March 20, 1997, with the record closing on March 25, 1997. (Hearing officer) presided as hearing officer. He determined that the appellant (claimant herein) was not entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBS) for the fourth quarter. The claimant appeals, stating only that the great weight of the evidence is contrary to this determination. The respondent (carrier herein) replies that the decision is correct and should be affirmed.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant sustained a compensable back injury in a lifting incident on _____. Medical tests disclosed herniation at L4-5, and Dr. B, the claimant’s treating doctor, diagnosed thoracic sprain and lumbar disc syndrome. The claimant was assigned an 18% impairment rating (IR).
Sections 408.142 and 408.143 provide that an employee continues to be entitled to SIBS after the first compensable quarter if the employee: (1) has not returned to work or has earned less than 80% of the employee’s average weekly wage (AWW) as a direct result of the impairment and, and (2) has in good faith sought employment commensurate with his or her ability to work. Pursuant to Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.102(b) (Rule 130.102(b)), the quarterly entitlement to SIBS is determined prospectively and depends on whether the employee meets the criteria during the prior quarter or “filing period.” Under Rule 130.101, “filing period” is defined as “[a] period of at least 90 days during which the employee’s actual and offered wages, if any, are reviewed to determine entitlement to, and amount of, [SIBS]” for any quarter claimed. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 941490, decided December 19, 1994. The fourth SIBS quarter was from December 25, 1996, to March 25, 1997, and the filing period for this quarter was from September 25, 1996, to December 24, 1996.
The claimant completed a Statement of Employment Status (TWCC-52) on December 11, 1996, in which he listed three employment contacts. He testified that he began part-time work on October 22, 1996, as a laborer, but the job only lasted three weeks and he was never called back because no work was available. He said that he never looked anywhere else for work before he got this job but that, after he was laid off, he made the two other employment contacts. The nature of the work applied for was not described. He also testified that he made other job applications, but did not recall the names of the employers or when he made the applications, but only that they were located in an area with other “factories.”
The key question in this case is whether the claimant made a good faith effort during the filing period for the fourth quarter to obtain employment commensurate with his ability to work. The Appeals Panel has generally defined good faith as a subjective notion characterized by honesty of purpose and being faithful to one’s obligations. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 941293, decided November 8, 1994. Whether the required good faith job search exists is a question of fact for the hearing officer to decide. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950307, decided April 12, 1995. We have also cautioned that good faith is not established simply by some minimum number of job contacts, but a hearing officer may consider the manner in which the job search is undertaken “with respect to timing, forethought and diligence.” Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 960268, decided March 27, 1996. It has also been noted that the requirement for a good faith job search generally spans the filing period where there is a return to light duty for the whole period. See generally Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 951832, decided December 15, 1995.
The claimant identified three job contacts, one of which led to a brief job. He also referred in vague terms to some other job applications without identifying when he made these applications. The hearing officer described the claimant’s testimony as “not entirely persuasive.” His factual determination that the claimant did not make the required good faith job search effort is subject to reversal only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly erroneous and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Applying this standard of review to this case, we are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion of the hearing officer that the claimant was not entitled to SIBS for the fourth quarter.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
Alan C. Ernst – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge
Christopher L. Rhodes – Appeals Judge