This appeal is brought pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). In Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 970851, decided July 2, 1997, the Appeals Panel reversed the determination of the hearing officer which limited the appellant’s (carrier) liability in this case only to a claimed injury on (Alleged injury), and rendered a decision that the finding of an injury in the course and scope of employment on ______, had become final by virtue of not being timely appealed. Consistent with these determinations, the Appeals Panel also reversed the hearing officer’s finding of no disability which was based on the absence of a compensable injury and remanded the issue of disability to the hearing officer for further proceedings based on the existence of a compensable ______, injury (temporal lobe epilepsy). On September 22, 1997, the hearing officer, conducted a further contested case hearing (CCH) and found that the respondent (claimant) had disability as a result of the compensable injury from August 1, 1996, to October 1, 1996. The carrier appeals these determinations asserting error in virtually all decision making by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) in this case and evidentiary insufficiency to support the finding of disability. The appeal file contains no response from the claimant.
DECISION
Affirmed.
We note initially that the carrier did not appeal the decision and order of the hearing officer which was the subject of this remand, nor did it respond to the claimant’s appeal of that decision and order. In its current appeal, it asserts what can be described as a request for reconsideration of our decision in Appeal No. 970851, supra, arguing that it recently discovered that the claimant’s appeal “may not have been timely.” Assuming the unlikely proposition that we have jurisdiction to revisit Appeal No. 970851, see Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Order No. 95029, decided November 2, 1995, and assuming the facts asserted in carrier’s appeal are correct, the relief requested is not warranted. The carrier states in its appeal that the claimant was deemed to have received the initial decision and order of the hearing officer on April 23, 1997, and that he had 15 days, that is until May 8, 1997, to file his appeal. The carrier further asserts that even though the claimant stated he filed his appeal with the Commission on May 7, 1997, it was not received until May 9, 1997, and is untimely. Records of the Commission reflect that the claimant’s appeal was dated and postmarked May 7, 1997. It was date stamped as received on May 9, 1997. Thus, pursuant to Tex. W.C. Comm’n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 143.3(c) (Rule 143.3(c)), the appeal was timely because it was mailed to the Commission by the 15th day after receipt of the decision and order and received by the Commission by the 20th day after receipt of the decision and order. This assertion of error is without merit.
The carrier next contends in its current appeal that even if the claimant’s appeal were timely, “the commission was without jurisdiction to add issues in violation of commission rule and was without jurisdiction to remand the case.” Though styled as a claim of lack of jurisdiction, we cannot agree that the Appeals Panel lacked jurisdiction to resolve the matters raised in the first appeal the way it did or to remand the issue of disability. At best, the appeal now raised by the carrier is that Appeal No. 970851, supra, is incorrect as a matter of law. The carrier, according to its appeal, is seeking a review of this decision in the district court of (County), Judicial District. At the same time it requests “a modified de novo review” of all findings in the prior CCH and the CCH on remand. Appeal No. 970851 is final regarding benefits while judicial review is pending. Section 410.255.
As stated in Appeal No. 970851, the finding of a compensable injury on _____________, became final because it was not timely appealed. In its current appeal to the Appeals Panel, the carrier seeks “modified de novo review” of the disability finding. The asserted basis for this request is that the evidence was insufficient to establish disability and there was “no probative medical evidence” to support this claim. Whether disability existed was a question of fact for the hearing officer to decide and could be proved based on the testimony of the claimant alone if found credible. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93560, decided August 19, 1993. The claimant testified that he was unable to work during the period from August 1, 1996, to October 1, 1996, despite efforts made to find employment. He attributed the reason for this two months of unemployment to his compensable injury which precluded his ability to drive or to maintain a driver’s license. He found employment as a contractor on October 1, 1996. The hearing officer found the claimant credible in these assertions. Medical evidence was not required to prove disability. Under our standard of appellate review contained in Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) and Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986), we decline to reverse this determination of disability.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
Alan C. Ernst – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Tommy W. Lueders – Appeals Judge
Judy L. Stephens – Appeals Judge