This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). Following a contested case hearing held on April 24, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) injury; that the date of the injury is __________; that the claimant had good cause for her failure to timely report her injury to the employer and that the appellant (carrier) is not relieved of liability under Section 409.002; that the claimant is not barred from pursuing Texas workers’ compensation benefits because of an election to receive benefits under a health insurance policy; and that the claimant had disability from August 12, 2000, through October 13, 2000, and from October 16, 2000, through the date of the hearing, April 24, 2001, as a result of the compensable injury of __________. The carrier appeals the injury, good cause for untimely notice, and disability determinations on evidentiary sufficiency grounds. The claimant’s response urges the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant our affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The hearing officer did not err in reaching the factual determinations appealed by the carrier. The claimant testified in detail about the nature and extent of telephone and data entry work she did for seven and one-half hours each day as a subrogation claims specialist for her insurance company employer. She also testified about how __________, she realized her right arm symptoms were caused by her work, and how until ________, she trivialized her right arm injury, which began with aching but improved from exercise and wearing a wrist splint, and which later became painful and was diagnosed as CTS. According to the claimant, who has not yet had carpal tunnel surgery, the employer would not change her duties and on August 11, 2000, told her to leave and not return until she could perform her job; she returned to work in October 2000 for a few days but was unable to continue her work because of the pain.
The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)). As an appellate reviewing tribunal, the Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge