This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on March 27 and May 11, 2001, with the record closing on May 11, 2001. The issues at the CCH were injury, date of injury, and timely report of injury. The hearing officer concluded that the appellant (claimant herein) did not sustain an injury in the course and scope of her employment; that the date of injury was __________; and that the claimant timely reported an injury. The claimant appeals, arguing that the evidence showed that she was exposed to hepatitis C while working for the respondent (self-insured herein). The self-insured responds that the evidence supported the decision of the hearing officer.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
The issue appealed from the CCH was whether the claimant sustained a compensable injury in the form of an occupational disease. The claimant contends that she contracted hepatitis C while working at a morgue operated by the self-insured. There was a great deal of evidence that the claimant was exposed to blood while working at the morgue. It was undisputed that the claimant has been diagnosed as having hepatitis C. The carrier presented testimony from Dr. M, who expressed an opinion that the claimant’s contention that she was infected with hepatitis C while working for the self-insured is medically unreasonable. Dr. I stated that it was just as likely that the claimant was infected with hepatitis C through sexual intercourse, tatooing, or her prior employment as a paramedic as it was that she was infected working for the self-insured.
The hearing officer found that there was insufficient evidence presented by the claimant that she contracted hepatitis C while working for the self-insured. The hearing officer in her decision points to the fact that the claimant could not point to any specific exposure to hepatitis C.
The question of whether an injury occurred is one of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93854, decided November 9, 1993; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93449, decided July 21, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
In the present case, the hearing officer found no injury. The claimant had the burden to prove she was injured in the course and scope of her employment. Reed v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Applying the standard of review set out above, we cannot say that the hearing officer was incorrect as a matter of law in finding that the claimant failed to meet this burden.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge