This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). Following a contested case hearing held on May 14, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable injury on __________, and that she did not have disability. The claimant has appealed, asserting what she believes her evidence proved. The respondent (carrier) urges in response that the evidence is sufficient to support the challenged determinations.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The hearing officer did not err in finding that the claimant did not injure her left knee on __________, while arising from the floor in the store where she worked after stocking cough drops on the lowest shelf, and that her subsequent inability to obtain and retain employment was not the result of a compensable injury. The claimant had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her knee injury was work-related and that she had disability as that term is defined in Section 401.011(16). There were conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence concerning how and when the claimant’s knee was injured, including emergency room notes that the claimant gave a history of injuring the knee at home on a different date. The hearing officer’s decision sets out the evidence and the hearing officer makes clear that she did not find the claimant’s evidence, including the testimony of the claimant’s daughter, persuasive.
The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)). The Appeals Panel, an appellate reviewing tribunal, will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The claimant also urges error in the hearing officer’s excluding from evidence the statement of a coworker because the hearing officer did not find good cause to admit the document which, according to the carrier, was not exchanged with the carrier before the hearing. The claimant conceded that she may have overlooked including the coworker’s statement in her exchange of evidence. We are satisfied that the hearing officer’s ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1986).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge