This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on June 6, 2001. With regard to the disputed issues, the hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) had not sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury on _____________, and that the claimant did not have disability.
The claimant appealed, contending that the symptoms and pain from her present alleged injury are “different than the pain [she] experienced from the car accident [MVA].” The claimant contends that she has sustained a new repetitive trauma injury and has had disability from ____________, and continuing. The respondent (self-insured) responds, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant was involved in an unrelated MVA on __________, when the vehicle she was riding in was rear-ended by another vehicle. The claimant alleged injuries to her neck, both shoulders, both arms, right hand, and left knee. The claimant’s treating doctor for those injuries was Dr. Z. Dr. Z released the claimant to return to limited duty on August 16, 2000, with a restriction of “no repetitive use of arms bilaterally.”
The claimant was employed as a clerk by the self-insured. The claimant described her job duties, which included some typing “on and off,” perhaps an hour a day. The hearing officer found that the claimant’s “work duties were varied in nature.” The claimant testified that she began having problems with her hands and arms in December 2000 and this was a different pain than she had as a result of the MVA. The claimant had a “coaching conference” where her job performance was discussed on January 29, 2001 (the claimant, in her appeal, asserts the conference was January 26 but the documentary evidence indicates it was January 29, 2001). The claimant then went back to Dr. Z and subsequently reported a repetitive trauma injury on ___________. The hearing officer found that the claimant “reported nearly identical symptoms to those which she complained of as being due to her [MVA]” and determined that the claimant’s present complaints were “a continuation of the injury she sustained in the [MVA].” The claimant argues that the hearing officer “confused these two distinct pains.”
The evidence is in conflict. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)), resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)), and determines what facts have been established from the conflicting evidence. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera, 385 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In that we are affirming the hearing officer’s determinations that the claimant has not sustained a compensable repetitive trauma injury, the claimant cannot, by definition, have disability.
The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge