This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on July 18, 2001, and the record closed on July 23, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the respondent’s (claimant) compensable injury of __________, does include an injury to the right shoulder.
The appellant (carrier) appeals the hearing officer’s determination, arguing that the claimant’s compensable injury of __________, does not include an injury to the right shoulder. The claimant did not file a response.
DECISION
Affirmed.
At the CCH, the parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on __________. The claimant testified that she was employed as a restaurant manager by the employer. The claimant testified that while she was walking in the employer’s kitchen, she caught her foot on a drain grid and slipped and fell on her buttocks, spine, head and hands on __________. The claimant testified that she had had a previous injury to her right shoulder when she fell off a polo pony in October 1997. The claimant stated that she had surgery to her right shoulder in the summer of 1998, and a second surgery to her right shoulder on June 21, 1999, after she slipped and fell at the employer’s restaurant. The carrier contends that the claimant’s present shoulder condition is due to the 1997 polo pony accident. The hearing officer commented that the compensable __________ fall injury aggravated the claimant’s preexisting condition which constituted “a compensable injury” and that the compensable injury includes the aggravation to the right shoulder.
This is an extent-of-injury case, and the Appeals Panel has held that the question of extent of injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. The hearing officer determined from the claimant’s testimony and medical reports in evidence that the compensable injury “does include an injury to the right shoulder.”
It is the hearing officer, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)), who resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)), and determines what facts have been established from the conflicting evidence. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera, 385 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This is equally true of medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The hearing officer’s determination is supported by sufficient evidence. The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL ST., SUITE 2900
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge