This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on July 31, 2001. On the sole issue before him, the hearing officer determined that the respondent/cross-appellant (claimant) did not sustain bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome (CTS) to her wrists at the time she sustained the initial compensable injury on _____________, and that the _____________, compensable injury does not include bilateral CTS. The appellant/cross-respondent (self-insured) appealed, asserting that the hearing officer should have found in his conclusions of law that the claimant did not sustain bilateral CTS at any time. The claimant appealed, asserting that the hearing officer’s decision was against the great weight of the evidence, and that he did not address whether the CTS to her left hand was caused by her specific injury. The self-insured responds that this decision is correct.
DECISION
Affirmed.
On ______________, the claimant sustained a compensable injury to her left wrist when she hit it on a door while moving a table. She was initially diagnosed as having a “left wrist injury,” and was eventually diagnosed with bilateral CTS. Her theory of recovery appeared to be a mixture of theories of repetitive trauma overlaid with the effects of the single trauma of hit her hand.
We turn first to the self-insured’s appeal. Upon review of the hearing officer’s decision and order, he makes a finding that the claimant does not have bilateral CTS as a result of her injury. This supports the complained-of conclusion of law, whether the conclusion of law restates “bilateral” or not. We find no error in any discrepancy.
The hearing officer did not err in not explicitly discussing the claimant’s separate theories of recovery. The claimant contends that the CTS to the left hand was caused by her specific compensable injury, and the CTS to the right hand was an occupational disease. Upon review of the hearing officer’s decision and order, it is clear that he did not believe that the alleged CTS in either hand was work related. He stated that he found the doctor’s opinion which linked CTS to the specific incident, as not credible. He also noted the lack of evidence to sufficiently prove a repetitive CTS injury. The decision meets the requirements of Section 410.168(a). Whether an employee has a compensable injury, or whether an injury extends to a particular member of the body, is a factual matter for the hearing officer to determine. Upon review of the record submitted, we find no reversible error, and we will not disturb the hearing officer’s determinations unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). We do not so find in this case.
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
MIKE MOSES, SUPERINTENDENT
3700 ROSS AVENUE
DALLAS, TEXAS 75204.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge