This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on August 13, 2001. With regard to the sole issue before him, the hearing officer determined that the respondent (claimant herein) was entitled to supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the fourth quarter. The appellant (carrier herein) argues that the hearing officer erred in finding the claimant was entitled to these benefits, specifically challenging the hearing officer’s finding that the claimant met the following requirements for eligibility to SIBs during the qualifying period for the fourth compensable quarter: that the claimant made a good faith effort to seek employment commensurate with his ability to work; that the claimant’s unemployment was a direct result of his impairment from his compensable injury; and that the claimant did not fail to cooperate with the Texas Rehabilitation Commission (TRC). The claimant responds that there was sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s findings that the claimant met the requirements to qualify for SIBs for the fourth quarter and that the carrier on appeal merely reiterates the factual arguments it made at the CCH.
DECISION
Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.
Section 408.142(a) outlines the requirements for SIBs eligibility as follows:
An employee is entitled to [SIBs] if on the expiration of the impairment income benefit [IIBs] period computed under Section 408.121(a)(1) the employee:
(1)has an impairment rating of 15 percent or more as determined by this subtitle from the compensable injury;
(2)has not returned to work or has returned to work earning less than 80 percent of the employee’s average weekly wage as a direct result of the employee’s impairment;
(3)has not elected to commute a portion of the [IIBs] under Section 408.128; and
(4)has attempted in good faith to obtain employment commensurate with the employee’s ability to work.
We have previously held that both the question of whether the claimant made a good faith job search and whether the claimant’s unemployment was a direct result of his impairment are questions of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94150, decided March 22, 1994; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94533, decided June 14, 1994. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). When reviewing a hearing officer’s decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence, we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust and we do not find it to be so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
The evidence supports the hearing officer’s finding that the claimant did “not fail to” cooperate with the TRC.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS, SUITE 750, COMMODORE 1
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge