This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on August 24, 2001. With respect to the issues before him, the hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable mental trauma injury on _____________, and that she did not have disability because she did not sustain a compensable injury. In her appeal, the claimant essentially argues that those determinations are against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the claimant’s appeal, the respondent (self-insured) urges affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant did not sustain a compensable mental trauma injury. It is well-settled that mental trauma, even without an accompanying physical injury, can produce a compensable injury if it arises in the course and scope of employment and can be traced to a definite time, place and cause. Bailey v. American General Insurance Co., 279 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1955); Olson v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972). However, the Texas Supreme Court has specifically held that damage or harm caused by repetitious mentally traumatic activity, as opposed to physical activity, cannot constitute an occupational disease. Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979); see also Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 941551, decided December 23, 1994; and Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94785, decided July 29, 1994.
The evidence supports the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant did not sustain a compensable mental trauma injury because her alleged injury was the product of repetitively stressful events at work. Accordingly, the claimant’s alleged injury does not fall within the compensable mental trauma injuries recognized in the 1989 Act.
The hearing officer also determined that the claimant’s evidence failed to establish that the employer engaged in an “illegitimate personnel act causing Claimant a mental or emotional injury . . . .” Section 408.006(b) provides that a “mental or emotional injury that
arises principally from a legitimate personnel action . . . is not a compensable injury under this subtitle.” In evaluating whether an employer engaged in legitimate personnel action within the meaning of Section 408.006, the focus is not properly on the manner in which the direction was given. As we noted in Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93867, decided November 10, 1993, the questions of whether actions were appropriate and/or deserved or undeserved are better left to an employer’s grievance procedure than the workers’ compensation dispute resolution process. See also Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 950168, decided March 17, 1995, where we noted that Section 408.006 only refers to a personnel action being “legitimate” as opposed to fair. There is sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer’s legitimate personnel action determination. Our review does not demonstrate that the challenged determination is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust; accordingly, it will not be reversed on appeal. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). Because we have affirmed the hearing officer’s determination that claimant did not sustain a compensable mental trauma injury, we likewise affirm the determination that she did not have disability in that a compensable injury is a necessary prerequisite to a finding of disability. Section 401.011(16).
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the self-insured is (SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge