This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on August 13, 2001. She determined that the appellant (claimant) was not persuasive in proving that he sustained a compensable injury or had disability. She further held that the claimant did not make a binding election of remedies and that he gave timely notice of an injury to his employer.
The claimant has appealed the determinations against him, arguing that his medical evidence proved an injury. The respondent (carrier) has responded that the fact findings of the hearing officer are supported in the record.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant had not proven that he sustained a large herniation while performing work-related activities. The evidence was in conflict between the testimony as to how the accident occurred and statements or representations that the claimant gave at the time about the mechanism of injury.
The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.- El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
The decision of the hearing officer will be set aside only if the evidence supporting the hearing officer’s determination is so weak or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We do not agree that this was the case here, and affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS STREET, SUITE 750, COMMODORE I
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Robert E. Lang
Appeals Panel
Manager/Judge
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge