Following a contested case hearing held on August 10, 2001, pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act), the hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that, based on the report of the designated doctor, the appellant (claimant) reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) on August 4, 2000, with an impairment rating (IR) of zero percent. The claimant has appealed, urging that the MMI date and IR determined by the designated doctor are premature, given the recency of her injury and the objective findings of diagnostic testing, and thus that they are contrary to the great weight of the other medical evidence. The respondent (carrier) urges in response that the evidence is sufficient to support the challenged determinations.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on _____________. The claimant testified that on that date she injured her neck, left shoulder, and back from lifting toner cartridges on the employer’s assembly line. She acknowledged having filed a previous workers’ compensation claim for a ________ carpal tunnel syndrome injury and said she received a nine percent IR for that injury. In his report of June 6, 2000, Dr. O stated that the claimant reached MMI on June 6, 2000, with an IR of zero percent and requires no further medical management. In his August 4, 2000, report, Dr. M, a chiropractor, opined that the claimant requires four to six months of treatment as well as additional testing, and that she has not reached MMI. In his Report of Medical Evaluation (TWCC-69) dated August 4, 2000, the designated doctor, Dr. R, a chiropractor, certified that the claimant reached MMI on “08-04-00” with an IR of “0%.” In his detailed accompanying report of August 11, 2000, Dr. R specified that he had the April 20, 2000, MRI films of the claimant’s cervical and lumbar spinal regions and of her left shoulder, the studies the claimant relies upon to substantiate her position that she has not yet reached MMI. Dr. R also states that the claimant “demonstrates 8/8 Waddell’s tests which is highly significant for symptom magnification,” that her “complaints and symptomology are completely inconsistent with the mechanism of injury and the clinical findings,” and that “[t]here is little to no correlation between the symptomology and documented injury.” In a subsequent report, Dr. R responded to a critique of his report, clarified his report with additional explanation, and did not change his opinions.
Sections 408.122(c) and 408.125(e) provide with respect to the determination of MMI and the IR that the report of the designated doctor selected by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission shall have presumptive weight and that the Commission shall base the MMI date and IR on such report unless it is contrary to the great weight of the other medical evidence. The Appeals Panel has often noted the “important and unique position” occupied by the designated doctor under the 1989 Act; that a “great weight” determination amounts to “more than a mere balancing or preponderance of the medical evidence”; that a designated doctor’s report should not be rejected “absent a substantial basis to do so”; and that the opinion of a designated doctor should be weighed according to its “thoroughness, accuracy, and credibility with consideration given to the basis it provides for opinions asserted.” Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92412, decided September 28, 1992; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93039, decided March 1, 1993; and Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93493, decided July 30, 1993.
The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)) and, as the trier of fact, resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence including the medical evidence (Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is SIERRA INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
C T CORPORATION SYSTEMS
350 ST. PAUL STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
Robert W. Potts – Appeals Judge