This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on August 14, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a back injury through repetitive trauma; that the date the claimant first knew, or should have known, that his injury may be related to his employment was ____________; that he did not give timely notice of his injury to his employer and did not have good cause for the delay; and that he was unable to obtain and retain employment due to the injury from July 10, 2000, through January 14, 2001, but did not have disability because the injury was not compensable.
The claimant appeals and points out evidence that he believes proved his case. The carrier responds that the decision is supported by the record and points out where the evidence of the claimant fell short of his burden of proof.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The hearing officer has fairly set out the facts; as stated, it is clear that there was conflicting evidence on the issues for which the CCH was held. The burden is on the claimant to prove that an injury occurred within the course and scope of employment. Service Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Martin, 855 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ); Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Page, 553 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1977). At a minimum, proof of a repetitive trauma injury should consist of some presentation of the duration, frequency, and nature of activities alleged to be traumatic. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 960929, decided June 28, 1996. The trier of fact is not required to accept a claimant’s testimony at face value, even if not specifically contradicted by other evidence. Bullard v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, 609 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ). The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, the materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
Section 409.001(a)(1) and (b) require that the injured employee give notice of an accidental injury to a person in a supervisory or management capacity within 30 days. However, the notice given, while it need not be fully detailed, should at a minimum apprize the employer of the fact of an injury and the general area of the body affected. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Mathes, 771 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied). In this case, although an injury was reported, the evidence as to whether the claimant made clear that the injury occurred at work was left open to interpretation by the fact finder.
Temporary income benefits are due when an injured worker has not reached maximum medical improvement and has disability. Section 408.101(a). Section 401.011(16) defines “disability” as: “the inability because of a compensable injury to obtain and retain employment at wages equivalent to the pre-injury wage.” Without a finding that there was a compensable injury, there can be no disability.
In considering all the evidence in the record, we cannot agree that the findings of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
350 NORTH ST. PAUL, SUITE 2900
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.
Susan M. Kelley
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge