This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on August 20, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by determining that the respondent (claimant) sustained a compensable injury on _____________, and that she had resulting disability beginning on December 5, 2000, continuing through the date of the CCH. The appellant (carrier) appealed on sufficiency grounds and the claimant responded, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant sustained a compensable injury and that she had resulting disability. On appeal, the carrier asserts that the claimant’s medical evidence is insufficient to support a determination of injury and disability. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). There was conflicting medical evidence submitted on the issues of injury and disability. We cannot agree in this case that evaluation of a shoulder injury was beyond common experience. The hearing officer specifically stated that she gave greater weight to the medical evidence submitted by the claimant than she did to that submitted by the carrier, and she was acting within her role as fact finder in so doing. Nothing in our review of the record indicates that the hearing officer’s determinations are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Accordingly, no sound basis exists for us to disturb those determinations on appeal. Pool v. Ford Motor Company, 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). We affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CT CORPORATION
350 NORTH ST. PAUL
DALLAS, TX 75201.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge