This case returns following our remand in Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 011842, decided September 25, 2001, where we remanded the case for the required carrier information. That information was placed in the record and forwarded to the respondent (claimant). No hearing on remand was held, and the hearing officer reissued her prior decision and order without substantive modification. The hearing officer determined that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on __________, and that the appellant (carrier) is not relieved of liability pursuant to Section 409.002 because the claimant timely reported her injury to a person in a supervisory position in accordance with Section 409.001. In its appeal, the carrier asserts error in each of those determinations. There is no response to the carrier’s appeal from the claimant.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant sustained a compensable injury on __________. That issue presented a question of fact for the hearing officer. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Section 410.165(a); Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). There was conflicting evidence on the issue of whether the claimant sustained a compensable back injury lifting a patient from a wheelchair. It was for the hearing officer, as the trier of fact, to resolve the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and to determine what facts had been established. Garza v. Commercial Ins. Co., 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). Sufficient evidence supports the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant sustained a compensable injury at work on __________, particularly her testimony and the medical evidence from the doctors who treated the claimant. Nothing in our review of the record reveals that the injury determination is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. As such, no sound basis exists for us to reverse that determination on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).
The hearing officer also did not err in determining that the carrier was not relieved of liability because the claimant timely reported her injury to her employer pursuant to Section 409.001. The carrier argues that the person to whom the hearing officer found the claimant reported her injury was not a supervisor. However, we find no merit in this assertion because the evidence establishes that the person to whom the claimant reported her injury had task-assigning authority and, as such, she was a supervisor for purposes of receiving notice of injury under the 1989 Act. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 010226, decided March 20, 2001; Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 010020, decided February 12, 2001. The carrier’s reliance on Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 991704, decided September 23, 1999, is misplaced. The carrier contends that in making her notice determination, the hearing officer “puts the burden on the employer to accept whatever is being stated as a report of injury.” The relevant discussion in the hearing officer’s decision belies the carrier’s assertion. The hearing officer clearly determined that the claimant reported that she sustained a work-related injury to a person in a supervisory capacity. The hearing officer’s notation that the recipient of the notice did not speak Spanish and that the claimant reported her injury in Spanish was an explanation for the contrary testimony of the person to whom the injury was reported. The hearing officer did not, as the carrier asserts, eliminate the requirement that the claimant tell her employer that she sustained a work-related injury. We perceive no error in the hearing officer’s notice determination.
The hearing officer’s decision and order are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is THE CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge