This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on July 31, 2001, and September 25, 2001. He determined that the appellant (claimant) did not suffer a compensable injury or have the inability to work at a wage equivalent to his preinjury average weekly wage as a result of the alleged injury. The claimant appeals, and argues that he proved his injury through medical evidence and testimony. The respondent (carrier) asks that the decision be affirmed.
DECISION
We affirm the hearing officer’s decision.
It was the claimant’s theory that he was injured, specifically with a post-concussion syndrome, when he was struck in the face on __________, by a chain on a drilling rig. The claimant said that after this blow, he had headaches and dizziness. He argued that, beginning February 8, occasions of syncope resulted from this syndrome. Objective testing of the brain was normal. The claimant enlisted in the armed services but was discharged after syncope episodes, for post-concussion syndrome. There were observations, testified to by his family members, of a bruise on the side of his face on the day of the alleged incident; but, he apparently did not have broken skin or seek medical treatment at this point. By the time of the CCH, he was troubled with headaches but not dizziness.
The evidence was conflicting. The claimant’s treating doctor testified that the claimant had a prior history of “drop attacks” that she believed were aggravated when, the claimant turned his neck sharply as he was struck by the chain. The safety director for the employer stated that if the claimant had been hit in the face with any force by the chain, he would have sustained lacerations. The safety director also stated that he investigated the incident and found that the claimant had not reported his injury on the day that he was injured. There was some testimony indicating the possibility that the claimant may have been struck by a braided rope at the end of the chain.
The hearing officer could believe that the claimant hit his head on February 8 when he fainted at home and that this could be the cause of any post-concussion syndrome. He evidently was not convinced that any impact from the chain was sufficient to cause the symptoms that the claimant testified to. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
In considering all the evidence in the record, we cannot agree that the findings of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). We affirm the decision and order.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
GEORGE MICHAEL JONES
9330 LBJ FREEWAY, SUITE 1200
DALLAS, TEXAS 75243.
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge