This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 8, 2001. The hearing officer resolved the disputed issues by concluding that the compensable injury sustained on __________, does not include an injury to the low back consisting of a benign cavernous hemangioma at L2, annular disc bulges at L2-3, L3-4, and L4-5 with a slight desiccation of L3-4 and L4-5 and an annular fissure of the L4-5 disc and that the claimant does not have disability. The appellant (claimant) appeals, arguing that the hearing officer incorrectly weighed the evidence presented, incorrectly applied the law, and ruled in such a fashion as to be manifestly unjust and against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The respondent (carrier) contends in its response that the credible medical evidence supports the determinations made by the hearing officer and should be affirmed on appeal.
DECISION
We affirm.
The claimant testified that he was employed as a truck driver for the employer. The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury of a lumbar sacral strain on __________. The claimant testified that as a result of that compensable injury he only missed two or three days of work. The records reflect and the claimant testified that after he returned to work he did not seek medical treatment again until March 6, 2001, over a year from the __________, incident. In a report dated May 7, 2001, Dr. G stated that “it seems the low back strain of __________, was totally resolved.” In the same report, Dr. G went on to state that the claimant “relates he never had a low back injury at home on March 6, 2001, and on that basis this is why [he states] that the [claimant’s] progressive radiculopathy, discogenic pain as well as his herniated disc are all a direct result of date of injury of __________.”
At the CCH, the safety coordinator of the employer testified that she had observed the claimant perform his job tasks prior to March 6, 2001, without any obvious discomfort. The safety coordinator additionally testified that the claimant did not miss any work from the time he was released in January 2000, until March, 2001. In a peer review report authored by Dr. T, he concluded that the MRI showed the claimant had a degenerative lumbar spine problem. There was conflicting medical evidence presented by the claimant. In a medical record dated April 3, 2001, Dr. B stated that it was his impression that the MRI of the lumbosacral spine is consistent with the fall of __________, concluding it was his assessment that the low back pain of the claimant was a direct result of the work-related accident of __________.
Extent of injury is a question of fact. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ).
As an appellate-reviewing body we will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing officer unless the challenged findings are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). We are satisfied the evidence sufficiently supports the dispositive findings of the hearing officer. Further, we find no basis for the claimant’s assertion that the hearing officer incorrectly gave the carrier peer review too much evidentiary value as it was up to the hearing officer to determine how much weight to give the evidence.
The claimant’s challenge to the hearing officer’s disability determination is based upon his challenge to the hearing officer’s resolution of the extent-of-injury issue. Given our affirmance of the extent-of-injury determination, we likewise affirm the determination that the claimant did not have disability.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
MR. RUSSELL R. OLIVER, PRESIDENT
221 WEST 6TH STREET
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Susan M. Kelley – Appeals Judge
Thomas A. Knapp – Appeals Judge