This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 15, 2001. She determined that the fees submitted by the respondent (attorney), which were awarded by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) in an order dated July 25, 2001, were performed and were reasonable and necessary. The appellant (claimant) contends that these fees were unnecessary and fraudulent and requests that she be reimbursed for the fees awarded to the attorney. The attorney urges affirmance. The respondent (self-insured) did not appear at the hearing and likewise did not respond on appeal.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The evidence reflects that a benefit review conference (BRC) was held on June 26, 2001, to resolve issues relating to the claimant’s compensation claim. The claimant released the attorney from his services by letter dated July 17, 2001. The disputed fees reflect services performed between June 26 and July 16, 2001, and total 5.75 hours. The claimant contends that there should have been no additional services performed or fees incurred after the date of the BRC and that the disputed fees are duplicates of fees previously awarded to the attorney. The hearing officer determined that the fees were reasonable and necessary and that the order awarding the fees is proper under the 1989 Act.
The 1989 Act contains some of the factors to be considered in determining what are reasonable and necessary claimant’s attorney’s fees: (1) time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (5) the amount involved in the controversy; (6) the benefits to the claimant that the attorney is responsible for securing; and (7) the experience and ability of the attorney performing the services. Section 408.221(c). The 1989 Act puts the burden on the attorney to present written evidence of time, expenses, and any other evidence considered necessary by the Commission or a court, in order to make a determination on attorney’s fees. Section 408.221(b). The standard of review we apply to review an attorney’s fees order on appeal is whether the hearing officer abused his or her discretion. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92375, decided September 14, 1992. An award should not be set aside merely because the appellate court would have allowed a different amount because “[t]he range of what is reasonable is wide[.]” Espinoza v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 572 S.W.2d 816, 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e). The test for abuse of discretion in the context of judicial review as enunciated by the Texas Supreme Court is “whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles.” Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985). Upon review of the record in this case, we perceive no error in the hearing officer’s determination that the disputed fees were reasonable and necessary.
We note that the claimant makes numerous requests in her appeal which do not pertain to the disputed fees and, therefore, will not be addressed on appeal.
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the self-insured is STATE OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
For personal service:
RON JOSSELET, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
STATE OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT
300 W. 15TH STREET
WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR. STATE OFFICE BUILDING, 6TH FLOOR
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
For service by mail:
RON JOSSELET, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
STATE OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT
P.O. BOX 13777
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-3777.
Elaine M. Chaney
CONCUR:
Judy L. S. Barnes – Appeals Judge
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge