This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on October 23, 2001. With regard to the issue before him, he determined that the appellant (claimant) did not have disability resulting from an injury sustained on ___________. The claimant appealed, arguing that the hearing officer erred in determining disability. The respondent (carrier) filed a response urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
At the CCH, the parties stipulated that “[o]n ___________, the claimant sustained a compensable injury” to his low back while working for Employer 1. The claimant sought medical treatment from Dr. E and returned to full-duty work with Employer 1 on May 24, 2000. On August 21, 2000, the claimant resigned from his position with Employer 1 to work for Employer 2. The claimant did not receive medical care for his back during his employment with Employer 2, from August 2000, through January 2001. The claimant resigned from his position with Employer 2 in January 2001 and began to work for Employer 3 on February 20, 2001. During his employment with Employer 3, the claimant slipped and fell in the employees’ parking lot while getting into his truck. The medical records in evidence indicate that on March 27, 2001, the claimant sought medical treatment for his back (allegedly injured on ___________), and that an MRI dated April 20, 2001, showed a herniated disc at L5-S1. The claimant testified that he did not pursue a workers’ compensation claim because he was informed by Employer 3 that the fall was noncompensable because it occurred in the parking lot. The claimant resigned from his position with Employer 3 on April 22, 2001. The claimant was released to work light duty on April 30, 2001, and he was employed by Employer 4 on May 2, 2001; however, his employment was terminated on June 15, 2001. The claimant claimed disability due to the compensable low back injury for three periods: from March 16, 2001, through March 19, 2001; from March 26, 2001, through April 30, 2001; and from June 15, 2001, to the time of the CCH. The claimant testified that he has not worked since June 15, 2001.
The evidence sufficiently supports the hearing officer’s determination that the claimant was not rendered unable to obtain and retain employment at his preinjury wages by the injury of ___________. Section 401.011(16) provides that disability means the inability because of a compensable injury to obtain and retain employment at wages equivalent to the preinjury wage. The hearing officer was not persuaded by the claimant’s testimony or the medical records in evidence to determine that the claimant did have disability for the time periods in issue. The hearing officer stated that the claimant was able to obtain “wages exceeding his pre-injury wages, [which] is itself fatal to his assertion of disability.”
It is the hearing officer, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)), who resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)), and determines what facts have been established from the conflicting evidence. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera, 385 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This is equally true of medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual finding of a hearing officer unless it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find it so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is PETROSURANCE CASUALTY COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
ROBERT LEE
2221 E. LAMAR
SUITE 500
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76006.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Elaine M. Chaney – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge