This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 10, 2001. The hearing officer determined that the date of injury (the date appellant (claimant) knew or should have known that the occupational disease may be work related) was __________; that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury in the form of a compensable repetitive trauma injury or otherwise; and that the claimant timely notified her employer of the injury. The claimant appealed, arguing that the hearing officer erred in determining that she did not sustain a compensable injury. The respondent (carrier) filed a response, urging affirmance.
DECISION
Affirmed.
The claimant testified that she was employed as a customer service representative for the employer. She stated that on __________, she injured her left wrist while performing repetitive tasks, which included performing keystrokes on her computer ke0yboard, dragging and clicking the computer mouse, and answering service calls. The claimant testified that she sustained a prior right wrist injury in the form of carpal tunnel syndrome on __________. She stated that she had surgery to her right wrist and that, when she returned to work, her workstation was changed to make it ergonomically correct for her left hand.
The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant did not sustain a compensable repetitive trauma injury. Section 401.011(36) provides that a repetitive trauma injury means damage or harm to the physical structure of the body occurring as the result of repetitious, physically traumatic activities that occur over time and arise out of and in the course and scope of employment. The claimant has the burden to prove that an injury occurred within the course and scope of employment. Service Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Martin, 855 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ); Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Page, 553 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1977). The hearing officer opined that the claimant did not meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable injury in the form of a repetitive trauma injury to the left upper extremity.
It is the hearing officer, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence (Section 410.165(a)), who resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence (Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)), and determines what facts have been established from the conflicting evidence. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Escalera, 385 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). This is equally true of medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The Appeals Panel will not disturb the challenged factual findings of a hearing officer unless they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust and we do not find them so in this case. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.
The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is
CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY
800 BRAZOS
SUITE 750
COMMODORE 1
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.
Michael B. McShane – Appeals Judge
CONCUR:
Gary L. Kilgore – Appeals Judge
Philip F. O’Neill – Appeals Judge